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Ending the Floating Check Game: The
Policy Arguments For Delayed
Availability Reformt
By EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN*
Increasingly, retail bank1 depositors have encountered substantial
periods of delay in gaining access to the proceeds of checks and other
demand items that are in the process of collection.2 At the heart of the
problem is the inefficient method that banks use to process return items.
Long delays in processing check returns leave banks uninformed about
whether an item has been accepted or rejected by the payor bank. To
diminish the risk of withdrawal of uncollected balances created by dis-
honored or fraudulent checks, banks withhold access to deposits. 3 Thus,
t © Copyright 1985 Emma Coleman Jordan. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. In writing this Article, Professor
Jordan has drawn upon her experience as a drafter of the California Delayed Availability
Statute, which suggests a comprehensive approach under state law to the problem of delayed
funds availability.
I thank Pierre Loiseaux and Elizabeth Warren for thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts,
and Ilene Goldstein Block for invaluable research assistance.
1. Throughout this Article the term "bank" has been used to describe all financial insti-
tutions providing deposit and check clearing services governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. For a functional definition of bank, see U.C.C. § 1-201(4) (1978).
2. There are several reports within the banking industry on the problems of delayed
availability. See, e.g., AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 1984 RETAIL DEPOSIT SERVICES
REPORT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BANK ACTIVrIES 8-9, 41-42 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as 1984 DEPOSIT SERVICES REPORT]; BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, DELAYED
AVAILABILITY RETURN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT (1979) [hereinafter cited as RETURN
ITEM TAsKFORCE REPORT]; BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, RETURN ITEM NOTIFICA-
TION PROCEDURES: A TASK FORCE REPORT (1979) [hereinafter cited as NOTIFICATION PRO-
CEDURES]; Bank Administration Institute, Position Paper: BAI Delayed Availability Task
Force on Return Items (Nov. 1979), reprinted in Delayed Funds Availability: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Position Paper].
Further, consumer groups have conducted surveys of hold policies in selected geographic
areas. See, eg., When Is It Your Money, 49 CONSUMER REPORTS 648 (Nov. 1984); Consumer
Action, Press Release: CA Releases Survey on Check Hold Policies 2 (June 14, 1983) (copy on
file with the Hastings Law Journal ) [hereinafter cited as Consumer Action]. The Survey is
based upon a telephone survey of 55 financial institutions in the state of California.
3. A 1974 study, BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF EXCEPTION
ITEMS ON THE CHECK COLLECTION SYSTEM (1974) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT OF EXCEP-
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banks commonly delay the availability of uncollected funds for periods
ranging from four to twenty-one banking days.4 Blanket delays, applica-
ble to all deposits, are especially troublesome in light of the small number
of items that ultimately are dishonored. For some financial institutions,
the delayed availability policy also has become one of several tools to
protect slim profit margins, which seem to be under attack from every
quarter.5 Although there is no significant disagreement that financial in-
stitutions face some risk during the collection of items accepted for de-
posit, there is wide disagreement as to how these risks should be
managed within the existing legal framework.
6
TION ITEMS], reports that less than 1% of all checks processed are returned. The reasons for
returned items are as follows:
Insufficient Funds & Refer to Maker 72%
Payment Stopped 3%
Account Closed 4%





4. The Consumer Action survey of California financial institutions identified eight sav-
ings and loans which placed holds of 10-12 days on checks drawn on institutions in the same
city. For checks drawn on banks outside the city of deposit, but within the state, holds range
from 0-20 days. For out-of-state items the range was 4-21 days. Consumer Action, supra note
2, at 2; see also 1984 DEPOSIT SERVICEs REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. This study indicates that
88% of banks with $500 million or more in assets place holds on deposited items for uncol-
lected funds. Smaller banks (assets less than 50 million dollars) are less likely to place holds.
Only 43.4% of the smaller banks placed holds. The average hold that small banks place on out
of state checks is nine days. Id. at 41.
5. Theodore E. Allison, Staff Director for Federal Reserve Bank Activities, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acknowledged the probable role of delayed availa-
bility in revenue production:
It is frequently charged that delayed funds availability practices are intended to gen-
erate increased revenues for depository institutions at the expense of depositors. It
may well be that certain institutions are able to enhance their revenue through the
practice of imposing blanket rather than selective delay policies. This would be true
since blanket delay programs are relatively easy to implement and affect all or most
checks deposited.
Delayed Funds Availability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 8 (1982) (testimony of
Theodore E. Allison, Staff Director for Federal Reserve Bank Activities) [hereinafter cited as
Delayed Funds Availability Hearing].
6. See, e.g., Delayed Availability Problems of Banking Customers: Hearings on A.B. 1723
Before the California Senate Committee on Banking and Insurance, (August 17, 1983) (state-
ment of Emma Coleman Jordan, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis) [hereinaf-
ter cited as California Delayed Availability Hearings]:
There are three central features of the modern check collection system. First is the
provisional credit concept . . . . Second, the midnight deadline concept, defined
above, is used as a signal to each bank in the. . . collection chain, that it is too late
(Vol. 36
Predictably, bank customers have begun to insist on changes in the
legal rules that permit abuses. 7 Some argue that a few financial institu-
tions have converted what is essentially a defensive tool into a technique
that disadvantages many small depositors." Hold policies have their
greatest impact on individuals and small businesses because large corpo-
rate depositors now effect large fund transfers electronically, 9 thus avoid-
ing the float problems that occur with paper collection.10
to reverse the process. The system operates on the principle that no news is good
news. There is no message sent to confirm that a check has been paid. This fact is
central to understanding the way the system works. We have structured the check
collection system on the principle, borne out over more than 30 years of the Uniform
Commerical Code, that most checks are good and will be paid. The success of that
assumption is reflected in the fact that today more than 99.3% of all checks written
are good and will be paid when first presented. This is quite an impressive fact, given
the stability of these figures over time. A third, and related, aspect of check collec-
tion is that the system operates on the assumption that there will be a large volume of
items going forward with relatively few coming back.
7. The level of consumer complaint has increased in recent years and reached its height
during the hearings and public comment preceding the adoption of the California delayed
availability law. Act of Sept. 21, 1983, ch. 1011, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5388 (West) (amending
CAL. COM. CODE §§ 4212-4213 and supplementing CAL. FiN. CODE §§ 866.5, 866.6, 866.7,
866.9). In the course of debates preceding the adoption of the Act, Speaker Willie L. Brown,
Jr., the author of A.B. 1723, received almost 10,000 individual written expressions of support
for the proposed reform. Telephone interview with Kathleen Snodgrass, Legal Counsel to Cali-
fornia Assembly Speaker Willie L. Brown, Jr. (May 26, 1983). Many of the correspondents
cited personal difficulties with holds as the basis of their concern that the revisions succeed.
Further, an additional 8000 coupons and several hundred letters of protest were sent to
the California Superintendent of Banking in response to an article which appeared in two San
Francisco newspapers criticising proposed administrative regulations setting maximum hold
periods. Mandel, Consumer Alert, San Francisco Examiner, June 17, 1984, at A2, col. 1.
These comments were sent in response to proposed regulations authorized by the California
Delayed Availability Law. See State of California State Banking Department, Final State-
ment of Reasons (1984) (statement of the reasons for the order adopting subarticle 5 of article
30 of subchapter 10 of chapter 1 of title 10 of the California Administrative Code) (copy on fie
with the Hastings Law Journal ) [hereinafter cited as Final Statement of Reasons].
8. See Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 38-43 (statement of Robert J.
McEwen, Department of Economics, Boston College).
9. See Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1664 (1983). Scott notes that:
according to 1980 figures, wire transfers-instructions that funds be transferred from
one person to another implemented through electronic means-account for the
movement of $117 trillion each year. The average wire transfer is $2 million, as
compared with the average check of $570 and the average bank card transaction is
$38.
Id. at 1664.
10. In general, the most sophisticated electronic fund transfer systems are not available
directly for transactions by individual depositors. These systems include Fed Wire (available
for inter-bank fund transfers within the Federal Reserve System), Bank Wire (communication
and settlement service available only to depository institutions), and CHIPS (transfers and
settlements among participating New York City banks). Id at 1668-73.
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Article four of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) establishes
the legal framework for bank collections. Accordingly, an inquiry into
hold policies must address the basic question whether the U.C.C. pro-
vides a useful approach to the central problem of the timing of return
item processing. In fact, the current difficulty arguably stems largely
from a conceptual vacuum within the U.C.C. concerning the processing
of return items. The controversy surrounding hold practices has pro-
vided an opportunity to reexamine the broad discretion permitted by ar-
ticle four of the U.C.C.1 1
This Article proposes limits upon the wide discretion now given to
financial institutions to determine when customers will be permitted to
withdraw deposited funds as a matter of right. The Article concludes
11. U.C.C. § 4-213 (1978) states:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the
following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and
without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agreement;
or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settle-
ment in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or
agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank shall be
accountable for the amount of the item.
(2) If provisional settlement for an item between the presenting and payor banks
is made through a clearing house or by debits or credits in an account between them,
then to the extent that provisional debits or credits for the item are entered in ac-
counts between the presenting and payor banks or between the presenting and suc-
cessive prior collecting banks seriatim, they become final upon final payment of the
item by the payor bank.
(3) If a collecting bank receives a settlement for an item which is or becomes
final (subsection (3) of Section 4-211, subsection (2) of section 4-213) the bank is
accountable to its customer for the amount of the item and any provisional credit
given for the item in an account with its customer becomes final.
(4) Subject to any right of the bank to apply the credit to an obligation of the
customer, credit given by a bank for an item in an account with its customer becomes
available for withdrawal as of right
(a) in any case where the bank has received a provisional settlement for the
item,-when such settlement becomes final and the bank has had a reason-
able time to learn that the settlement is final;
(b) in any case where the bank is both a depositary bank and a payor bank and
the item is finally paid,-at the opening of the bank's second banking day
following receipt of the item.
(5) A deposit of money in a bank is final when made but, subject to any right of
the bank to apply the deposit to an obligation of the customer, the deposit becomes
available for withdrawal as of right at the opening of the bank's next banking day
following receipt of the deposit.
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that amendments to article 4 of the U.C.C. would be the most durable
means of reform because article 4 is a uniform state law that establishes
the basic framework for the national payment system. It governs collec-
tions and returns that are accomplished inside or outside of the Federal
Reserve System. Moreover, the problem of delayed availability is closely
related to the body of rules governing check collection; any well-crafted
solution should be integrated into the U.C.C. as an amendment approved
by the Permanent Editorial Board.
This Article examines three legal problems resulting from functional
omissions from the U.C.C.: First, the U.C.C. neither specifies a means
for returning items nor sets a clear standard for the kind of performance
expected of banks within the chain of endorsement. The omissions are
critical. Absent guidance from the statute for determining the maximum
time allowable before funds must be made available, the standard of rea-
sonableness is vague and therefore meaningless. 12 As a result, the ac-
cepted practice is to send returned items by the cheapest and least
reliable method: the United States mail. 13 Second, the U.C.C. permits
payor banks to return a rejected item up the chain of endorsement to the
next prior endorser, 14 thus triggering a prolonged and often unpredict-
able sequence of events. Although direct return 15 from the payor bank to
the depositary bank is a more efficient option, most financial institutions
do not use this method. Their reluctance is based upon an uncertainty
about what is required to charge prior intermediate endorsers. 16 Third,
there is at present no uniform, enforceable requirement that a payor bank
must give a "wire notice" of return when it has decided not to pay an
item. 17 The present complex of uncertain rules surrounding the process-
ing of return items has further contributed to the slowness with which
return items are handled.
The Article considers the problem of delayed availability and pro-
12. The provisional credit given when an item is initially deposited is not available for
withdrawal as of right until the "bank has had a reasonable time to learn that the settlement is
final." U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(a) (1978) (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 102-
07.
13. See RETURN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2.
14. U.C.C. §§ 4-301(I)(a), 4-301(4) (1978).
15. Id. § 4-212(2). Several states, including California, did not adopt this provision when
it was initially proposed. The purpose of § 4-212 is to provide an opportunity for the payor
bank to minimize the loss which ordinarily would fall on the depositary bank if notice of
dishonor and, under this section, the returned item itself are delayed.
16. Id. §§ 4-301(l)(a), 4-301(4).
17. See, ag., Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F. Supp. 817,
821-22 (D. Conn. 1980); Nassau Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Yeiser v. Bank of Adamsville, 614 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Tenn.
1981).
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poses remedial legislation. First, it analyzes the essential elements of the
modern check collection system, 18 focusing on the differences in the
processing of the three categories of checks 19 and describing the involve-
ment of the Federal Reserve Bank in check collection. 20 The Article
then examines the disparity between check collections and check re-
turns. 21 The discussion demonstrates that the delay in check return re-
sults in a delay in availability of funds and that such nonavailability, in
conjunction with early provisional credits granted by the Fed, creates
check float.
22
The Article next criticizes the U.C.C. approach to the consumer's
right to withdraw funds.23 The discussion analyzes the relevant provi-
sions of the U.C.C. and concludes that the U.C.C. provides no means of
correcting the problem with check float. The Article then identifies and
discusses current obstacles to check processing reform. It considers
problems regarding notification, the deference accorded a bank's business
judgment, and the notable failure of attempts to litigate a resolution to
delayed availability.
24
Despite these obstacles, the Article argues, considerations of fairness
and efficiency require national reform of check processing procedures. 25
Depositors' expectations that funds will be available within predictable
and short periods of time must be balanced against the obvious benefit to
the financial system of reducing the risks from fraud and dishonor. Yet
the discrepancy between the accurate and speedy handling of the large
volume of items during initial forwarding to the payor bank and the
slow, error-filled processing of the small number of dishonored items is
unwarranted and unfair. That unfairness is exacerbated by blanket hold
policies with discretionary exemptions for certain powerful bank
customers.
Finally, the Article proposes legislative action to protect the banks'
interests while also protecting consumers. 26 Section 4-213 of the U.C.C.
should be revised to provide for state administrative regulation of maxi-
mum holds on uncollected deposits. 27 Definition of reasonable periods
18. See infra notes 30-50 & accompanying text.
19. The three types are on-us items, clearinghouse items, and transit items.
20. See infra notes 51-85 & accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 86-93 & accompanying text.
22. See infra note 94 & accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 96-107 & accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 122-78 & accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 108-21 & accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 179-223 & accompanying text.
27. This is the approach adopted in California. Act of Sept. 21, 1983, ch. 1011, 1983 Cal.
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for delay in the availability of funds, disclosure of hold policies, and noti-
fication of holds on individual transactions will diminish the element of
surprise that is a source of depositor complaints. In addition, collecting
and payor banks should be required to use the most expeditious means of
processing return items; the banking industry might be motivated to
make further improvements in the processing of return items. National
reform is needed, and the recent experience in two states28 suggests that
such reform can succeed.
The Modern Check Collection System
Each year approximately thirty-five billion checks are processed for
collection. 29 The process begins at the bank of deposit and, if the check
is paid, ends at the bank on which the check has been drawn. The proce-
dures and legal rules governing the handling of checks pending collection
are a blend of banking industry custom, the requirements of the U.C.C.,
and Federal Reserve regulations. A brief description of the way in which
checks are collected sets the stage for assessing the possibilities for
delayed availability reform.
The Initial Collection of a Check
A check that has been accepted for deposit falls in one of three cate-
gories: the on-us item, the clearinghouse item, and the transit item. A
description of each of these follows.
On-Us Items
On-us items, checks that have been drawn on and deposited in the
same institution, represent slightly more than one-half of all checks writ-
ten. 30 When a teller accepts an on-us item, the depositor is given a re-
versible bookkeeping credit called a "provisional credit. ' 31 In the
absence of dishonor, this temporary credit will become final with the pas-
Legis. Serv. 5388 (West) (amending CAL. COM. CODE §§ 4212-4213 and supplementing CAL.
FIN. CODE §§ 866.5, 866.6, 866.7, 866.9).
28. Id.; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-d (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
29. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE SHOULD MOVE FASTER TO ELIMINATE SUBSIDY OF CHECK
CLEARING OPERATIONS (May 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT].
30. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29; Delayed Funds Availability
Hearings, supra note 5, at 4.
31. "'Settle' means to pay in cash, by clearing house settlement, in a charge or credit or
by remittance, or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be either provisional or final."
U.C.C. § 4-104) (1978); see also B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, CHECK COLLEC-
TIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 4.9, at 4-60 (rev. ed. 1981).
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sage of an unspecified length of time after the deposit was initially ac-
cepted. Establishing the time of final payment is important because, even
for on-us items, a customer is not entitled to withdraw funds until the
item has been paid.
32
The U.C.C. determines when the entry becomes final. 33 For an on-
us item, the provisional credit becomes final and the depositor has a right
to withdraw "at the opening of the bank's second banking day following
receipt of the item."' 34 Thus, more than half of the checks written today
ordinarily do not present delayed availability issues because the U.C.C.
has set a definite time35 after which customers can draw on these funds as
a matter of right.
This fixed deadline, the opening of business of the second banking
day after receipt, accommodates both the bankers' and the customers'
expectations that funds will be made available within prescribed, definite
times. Because the decision to pay items drawn on the institution in
which they are deposited can be made and communicated quickly, the
availability of these funds can be determined within statutorily defined
time periods. Thus, for on-us transactions, the U.C.C. acknowledges
that a fixed time period is an appropriate measure of the legal obligation
of banks to make funds available to their customers.
Clearinghouse and Transit Items
A clearinghouse is an arrangement between banks in the same city
or region to exchange checks at a regular, predetermined time. 36 Deposi-
tary and collecting banks37 present checks for payment to other collect-
32. U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(b) (1978) (emphasis added) provides that credit becomes available
for withdrawal as of right "in any case where the bank is both a depositary bank and a payor
bank and the item is finally paid,-at the opening of the bank's second banking day following
receipt of the item."
33. Final payment has occurred when one of the events listed in § 4-213(1) has taken
place, thus rendering the payor bank accountable. See supra note 11.
34. U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(b) (1978).
35. The midnight deadline is another standard, based on time, for assessing the perform-
ance of collecting banks. The "midnight deadline" with respect to a bank is midnight on its
next banking day following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or
from which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later. Id. § 4-104(I)(h);
see also id. § 4-202(2).
36. For a description of modem clearinghouse arrangements, see Frodin, Fed Pricing and
the Check Collection Business: The Private Sector Response, Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 15.
For a description of early clearinghouse arrangements, see W. SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND
COLLECTION OF CHECKS 103 (1926).
37. " 'Depositary bank' means the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection
even though it is also the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(a) (1978). "'Collecting bank' means
any bank handling the item for collection except the payor bank." Id. § 4-105(d); see infra
note 43.
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hig or payor banks at these clearinghouse exchanges. The Federal
Reserve is a major clearinghouse, although private clearinghouses are
also common.
The exchange of checks within citywide clearinghouses is still done
the old-fashioned way. In New York City, for instance, the New York
Clearing House, an association of twelve banks, serves as the location for
messengers representing clearinghouse member banks to meet and ex-
change checks that have been cashed or accepted for deposit during the
previous day. This face-to-face exchange of bundles of checks, which
have been sorted according to the bank on which the item is drawn, is
completed within a matter of minutes. The net position 38 of each bank
at the end of the exchange is determined by a computerized calculation.
Each bank is credited for checks and items it has presented for payment
and debited for items presented by other banks for payment. Settle-
ment-an accounting between banks for items exchanged-is executed
by virtue of a net credit or debit to each bank's Federal Reserve account
balance.
39
The operation of the clearinghouse is determined by clearinghouse
rules. These rules are essentially a contract among the member banks.
Unlike ordinary contracts, however, the clearinghouse rules are binding
on depositors, even though the depositors have neither read them, nor
know of their existence.4° Section 4-103(2) of the U.C.C. gives such
rules the "effect of agreements. . . , whether or not specifically assented
to by all parties interested in items handled.
'41
Checks drawn on banks in a different region, city, state, or outside
38. See generally Leary, Check Handling Under Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 331 (1965); Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works, 11 How. L.J. 71
(1965).
39. For a description of the check exchange at the New York Clearing House, see Ross,
The Race is to the Slow Payer, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 1983, at 75.
40. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 555 n.12 (1972).
41. U.C.C. § 4-103(2) (1978). Comment 3 to this section expressly endorses a role for
clearinghouse rules:
Local clearing houses have long issued rules governing the details of clearing; hours
of clearing, media of remittance, time for return of mis-sent items and the like. The
case law has recognized such rules, within their proper sphere, as binding on affected
parties and as appropriate sources for the courts to look to in filling out details on
bank collection law. Subsection (2) in recognizing clearing house rules as a means of
preserving flexibility continues the sensible approach indicated in the cases. Included
in the term "clearing houses" are county and regional clearing houses as well as
those within a single city or town. There is, of course, no intention of authorizing a
local clearing house or a group of clearing houses to rewrite the basic law generally.
The term "clearing house rules" should be understood in the light of functions the
clearing houses have excercised in the past.
March 1985] DELAYED AVAILABILITY REFORM
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the United States, are called transit items.42 These items are handled in
very much the same way as clearinghouse checks, although longer peri-
ods of time are required for forwarding these items because they must
move through several regions before reaching their destination at a payor
bank.
43
The depositary bank has several options for how it forwards the
transit item for collection. The depositary may choose to forward the
item to a collecting bank with which it has an account. The check will in
turn be forwarded through a series of collecting banks to the payor bank
on which it has been drawn. During the transfer to the payor bank, the
item will receive provisional credit at each stop along the way. The cred-
its become final either when the payor bank has taken some positive ac-
tion to indicate that the item has been paid, or when the midnight
deadline has passed. 44 If the item is honored, the payor bank need not do
anything to firm up the provisional credits entered during the process of
collection. These credits automatically become final without further ac-
tion.45 The payor bank need not communicate the fact of payment to
anyone other than the customer on whose account the item is drawn.
46
A second option open to the depositary bank is to forward the item
directly to the payor bank by mail.47 If the depositary bank chooses to
mail the check directly to the payor bank, the depositary will give a pro-
visional credit to the depositor's account pending final payment. The de-
See infra note 177 for a discussion of the impact of § 4-103(1) on depositors' efforts to secure
early availability.
42. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 448 (transit item background).
43. "'Payor bank' means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."
U.C.C. § 4-105(b) (1978).
44. See supra note 35.
45. See U.C.C. § 4-212 comment 1 (1978):
Under current bank practice, in a major portion of cases banks make provisional
settlement for items when they are first received and then await subsequent determi-
nation of whether the item will be finally paid. This is the principal characteristic of
what are referred to in banking parlance as "cash items." Statistically, this practice
of settling provisionally first and then awaiting final payment is justified because
more than ninety-nine percent of such cash items are finally paid, with the result that
in this great preponderance of cases it becomes unnecessary for the banks making the
provisional settlements to make any further entries. In due course the provisional
settlements become final simply with the lapse of time.
46. Id.
47. The direct routing practice was expressly disapproved in early common law decisions
holding that it was against public policy and therefore negligent per se. In fact, the stated
reasons for this pre-U.C.C. rule of negligence are quite understandable. The primary concern
seems to have been the risk of failure of the drawee bank during the period of collection. It
was feared that a drawee bank in failing condition would defer action on mail presentments for
days, while paying out the majority of its cash in the interim. This, of course, would disadvan-
tage the payee of the mailed item. See J. MORSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND
[Vol. 36
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positary bank in turn will receive a provisional credit from the bank that
it has chosen for forwarding the item to the distant payor. Typically, the
agent for collection is the nearest Federal Reserve Bank.
The commentary to section 4-212 of the U.C.C. recognized that di-
rect return was a new practice that was just beginning to develop. Ac-
cordingly, the rule permitting direct returns was made an optional
provision of the U.C.C.a8 This method of return was intended
to speed up the return of unpaid items by avoiding handling by one or
more intermediate banks.... [T]he practice is not yet well estab-
lished and some bankers and bank lawyers would prefer to let the prac-
tice develop by agreement. The contention is made that substantive
rights between banks may be affected, e.g. available set-offs, but propo-
nents contend advantages of direct returns outweigh possible
detriments.
49
The section was thus included to grant banks greater flexibility.
50
The Federal Reserve System
The Role of the Federal Reserve in the Check Collection Process
As previously noted, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) is a major
clearinghouse, processing approximately forty percent of all checks writ-
ten in the United States.51 The overall speed and safety of the American
check clearing system is largely attributable to the reliable national net-
work made available for check clearing by the Fed.52 Federal Reserve
BANKNG § 236 (6th ed. 1928); see also Turner, Bank Collections---The Direct Routing Prac-
tice, 39 YALE L.J. 468, 471-72 (1930).
The U.C.C., however, expressly approves the practice today. Thus, cases such as
Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 120 Tenn. 225, 111 S.W. 248 (1908), were
rejected with the adoption of § 4-212(2), which endorsed the option of direct returns.
48. U.C.C. § 4-212(2).
49. Id. § 4-212 comment 4.
50. There has been a recent resurgence of direct exchanges, which one commentator at-
tributes to disincentives for using the Fed created by the introduction of pricing for check
clearing services. Frodin, supra note 36, at 13.
51. See Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 n.2 (testimony of Theodore
E. Allison, Staff Director of Federal Reserve Bank Activities). This figure assumes even
greater importance upon considering the fact that approximately 50% of all checks are on-us
items that have been deposited in the same bank on which they were drawn and therefore do
not require any clearing at all. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29.
52. The importance of the Federal Reserve in the check clearing system is acknowledged
in U.C.C. § 4-103 (1978). See B. CLARK, supra note 31, at 4-64. Regulation J sets the stan-
dard of care for banks which send items through the Fed. In general, compliance with the
terms of Regulation J will be sufficient to meet the standards for check collection stated in
article four.
In virtually every significant aspect, Regulation J and article 4 of the U.C.C. are in accord
on the rules governing check collection. There are, however, several areas in which the U.C.C.
and Regulation J differ. For example, Regulation J provides that the Fed is not an agent or
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check clearing services are now available to all banks, whether or not
they are members of the system.
53
When the Federal Reserve system was inaugurated, banking was be-
set by many unsound practices. Chief among these was the practice of
circuitous routing.54 To alleviate these abuses, an efficient nationwide
subagent of the owner of the item, but rather acts only as the sending bank's agent for collec-
tion. 12 C.F.R. § 210.5(a) (1984). Thus, unlike other banks, the Fed is immunized from a
direct action by the owner of an item for negligence in collection. See, e.g., Colonial Cadillac,
Inc. v. Shawmut Merchants Bank, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 760 (D. Mass. 1980).
The court in this case held that the payee of a draft could not sue the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston for negligence in handling the draft. The court concluded that § 210.6 of Regulation J
immunized the Fed from negligence liability to the sender of the item because it was not an
agent or subagent of the payee-owner. The supremacy clause required that the conflict between
article 4 and § 210 be resolved in favor of the provisions of Regulation J.
There has been one significant area of controversy concerning the relationship between
article 4 of the U.C.C. and Regulation J. The court in Community Bank v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 500 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1974), held that Federal Reserve Regulation J had the effect of an
agreement that was binding, without assent, on any bank which used the Fed check clearing
service. In this case the plaintiffs were several California banks that were not members of or
participants in the Fed collection system. They challenged a 1972 amendment to Regulation J
which required that settlement be made on the day the item was received by the Fed, rather
than by midnight of the day after receipt, as permitted in the U.C.C. They also objected to the
elimination of bank drafts as a permissible form of settlement. The court concluded that the
conflict between the Fed requirements and the more liberal provisions of the U.C.C. had been
avoided by the presence of § 4-103 which provided that the terms of the U.C.C. could be
varied by agreement, whether or not assented to by the parties. Id. at 286-88. This provision
had heretofore been applied to bind depositors to the terms of clearinghouse agreements. The
court found that Regulation J was also an agreement which varied the terms of the U.C.C. and
could therefore be given effect against nonmember banks that chose to use the Fed clearing
service, without conflict. Id. at 286-87. The court rejected the argument that the payor bank
plaintiffs were not bound by Regulation J because they were nonmembers. The court viewed
their voluntary use of the Fed collection system as conduct which triggered the application of
§ 4-103. Id. at 287-88.
53. Initially, Federal Reserve check clearing was available to member banks only. In
1971, nonmember banks were given direct access, without having to send checks first to a
member bank. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29, at 1.
54. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 103. "[T]he greatest evil in connection with the
collection of out-of-town checks . . .[is] the practice of sending them on long, devious and
circuitous routes in order to avoid remittance charges." Id. The author observes that the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-228 and
31 U.S.C. § 409 (1982)) was adopted, at least in part, to intervene in the system of private
contracts which produced the following abuses: (1) excessive charges, (2) indirect routing of
checks to avoid remittance charges, (3) immediate credit for uncollected funds, (4) interest
payments on uncollected funds, (5) compensating balances left with collecting banks solely to
obtain part payment, (6) maintenance of reserve balances with banks for the sole purpose of
getting items on which to charge exchange, (7) excessive gold movements, and (8) absorption
of collection charges by collecting banks. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 101-02.
Professor Scott, however, argues that there is no evidence that the abuses identified by
Spahr were the reason for federal intervention. He notes that many of the practices were




check clearing system was designed based on processing within geo-
graphical zones.:5 Today, the Federal Reserve processes checks through
a highly automated network of forty-eight regional processing centers.
56
The geographical organization of the Federal Reserve check clearing sys-
tem creates some economies of scale because most of the checks
processed by a regional processing center are drawn on banks within the
same region.5 7 The use of state-of-the-art banking technology also en-
hances efficiency. The centers are connected by chartered air couriers
and wire services dedicated exclusively to the Federal Reserve check
clearing business.5 8 High-speed check sorting is accomplished by using
machine-readable magnetic encoding (Magnetic Ink Character Recogni-
tion, MICR) on checks. This technique automatically identifies the
amount of the check and the Federal Reserve zone in which the payor
bank is located. Modem technology also speeds the handling of bundles
of checks accompanied by cash letters.
5 9
From its inception, the Fed was designed to encourage banks to use
the Federal Reserve system rather than the private clearinghouses or cor-
respondent banks. Several incentives were used to make the Fed a more
attractive clearinghouse. These incentives included immediate provi-
sional credit on all eligible collection items cleared through the Fed.6°
The decision to give immediate provisional credit was justified by the
assumption that the majority of collection items would be honored and
that very few would be charged back because of dishonor. 61 Initially, as
a precaution, immediate credit was not counted as a part of the bank's
reserve requirement 62 and was not available for withdrawal until the item
actually was paid.6 3 Later, withdrawals against uncollected funds were
permitted before confirmation of payment, and credit was made available
for withdrawal according to a schedule based upon the customary times
for receiving notice of dishonor from any given geographic pointA4 On
55. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 179 (background on the zone system).
56. Frodin, supra note 36, at 15 n.2.
57. COMPTROLLER GENERAi's REPORT, supra note 29, at 2.
58. Id.
59. The cash letter includes a dollar amount for each check in the bundle covered by
the receipt and processed by the Federal Reserve. Checks are required to be grouped
by geographic region because the availability of funds will depend upon the availabil-
ity schedule assigned to the region for the group. Id.
60. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 308; Turner, supra note 47, at 469.
61. See supra note 6.
62. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 179-80.
63. Id. at 180-81.
64. Each of the 12 Federal Reserve banks adopted its own schedule indicating the period
which must elapse before items subject to it could be available to be drawn against in the cash
reserve account. In 1920 the Federal Reserve Board approved an interdistrict time schedule
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the basis of this schedule, banks clearing through the Federal Reserve
were permitted to count these deposits toward their reserve requirements
after the fixed period identified in the schedule had elapsed.
65
Today, immediate credit is available for intra-city and intra-regional
checks. Credit on all other checks is available within one to two days. 66
Until July 1983, two days was the maximum period for deferred credit to
banks when the items were cleared through the Federal Reserve. In July
1983, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve adopted a system of
fractional availability in which the cost of float is reflected in the schedule
of availability for each item. 67 Now, part of an institution's credit for a
deposit is deferred an additional day. The fraction is determined so as to
set the average float for the institution at zero. 68
Settlement: The Role of the Reserve Account
69
Settlement for items cleared through Federal Reserve channels oc-
which served as the common framework for all of the 12 districts. As a result of the "aver-
age," rather than actual, transport or collection time schedule, Federal Reserve banks carried
float. Id.
65. For example, a bank to which a one-day availability had been assigned would be
entitled to treat an item as part of the cash reserve requirement on the first day after it was
deposited. In the event the item were dishonored, the depositary bank would be subject to a
reversal of the earlier credit and the reserve balance would be accordingly reduced. Turner,
supra note 47, at 470 (citing Pascagoula Nat'l Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 11 F.2d 866 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 685 (1926)).
66. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29, at 2. The Monetary Control Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982))
required the Federal Reserve to begin charging for its services, including the check clearing
service. See generally Frodin, supra note 36, at 13. A policy of fractional availability was
adopted to pass along the true cost of the check clearing operation and withdraw the subsidy
formerly obtained from the federal treasury. Id.
67. Federal Reserve System, Reduction and Pricing of Federal Reserve Float, Docket
No. R-0433 (Feb. 24, 1983)
68. Id.
The. . . plan proposed adjusting availability schedules on a fractional basis, as op-
posed to the traditional method of granting availability only in terms of whole days.
[An availability schedule lists when a depositary financial institution receives credit
to its reserve account for different types of checks deposited with the Federal Reserve
Bank for clearance.] For example, if 97% of check clearings between two Reserve
Offices actually occur in one day and 3% in two days, then 97% of the dollar amount
presented by depositary banks clearing between these two offices would be credited
the first day and 3% the second day. Thus, the 3% that regularly is not collected
until the second day would be eliminated as float.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29, at 45.
69. Lawyers, even those in the commercial paper and banking fields, usually do not
understand, or are uninterested in, the relationship of the reserve account to the check clearing
system. The discussion that follows is a short description, for lawyers, of the procedures for
settling checks through the collecting bank's reserve account with the Federal Reserve. A
comprehensive analysis of the working of the reserve account is beyond the scope of this
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curs through reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve bank in the geo-
graphic region. Banks that use the Federal Reserve clearing services are
required to maintain running reserve accounts. 70 These accounts serve
as the master accounting device for keeping track of the deposits and
credits owed to each bank. At any given moment, every bank is both a
depositary or collecting bank for some items and a payor bank for others.
Therefore, credits are given daily to depositing banks for items for which
they are entitled to immediate availability and for all items to which de-
ferred availability applies.71 Debits are entered for the total amount of
checks presented for collection. At the end of the day a status report is
compiled reflecting the net position of each institution. Adjustments in-
clude returned checks, arithmetic errors, and disputed items.72 The Fed-
eral Reserve provides banks with a fixed schedule of availability, which is
not dependent upon actual collection time.
The credit given to the reserve account for items that have not actu-
ally been collected is in essence an interest-free loan, an advance provided
to depositing institutions by the Federal Reserve. When the depositing
bank has received a credit, although the paying bank has not yet been
debited, Federal Reserve float is created.73 The daily dollar value of this
discrepancy has been valued at 3.2 billion.74
The amount of float outstanding in the Federal Reserve check clear-
ing system can have an important impact on the national economy. This
is so largely because controlling reserve accounts is the principal way
that the Federal Reserve monitors and restricts the growth of the money
supply. 75 Uncontrolled increases in the amount of float may undercut
the desired level of control of the money supply. In addition, the loss of
revenue to the federal treasury attributable to float contributes to the
federal deficit.76 By one estimate, the average amount of float in a single
Article. I have included those aspects which are helpful in explaining check clearing and the
delayed availability problems that are the focus of this discussion.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1982).
71. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Several reasons have been given for the existence of "Fed float": "peak workloads
that exceed processing capacity, delays in transportation, or transportation schedules that do
not permit collection within the time the Federal Reserve has allowed itself." Id at 4; see also
W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 474-75; UNITED STATES BOARD OF GOVERNORS, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM-ITS PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 192, 194 (1939).
74. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 29, at 4.
75. aLo at 43.
76. The Comptroller General estimates that "at current [1983] float levels, the Treasury
is losing revenue at an annual rate of up to about $400 million. . . ." Id. He notes further
that float is ultimately a cost to the taxpayers because it prematurely increases member bank
reserves at the expense of Federal Reserve Interest income. Id; see also infra note 66.
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year was equal to approximately one eighth of the total reserve account
balances then outstanding.
77
The Federal Reserve check clearing system also plays a dominant
role in the soundness and efficiency of the banking system itself.78 The
extent to which immediate credit should be available to collecting banks
from either the Fed or a correspondent has always been a matter of sub-
stantial controversy. During the early history of this country, the will-
ingness of some clearinghouses to grant immediate availability and to
permit member banks to treat these uncollected credits as cash was the
source of instability. 79 Even after the Federal Reserve clearing system
was in place, many private competitors continued to permit remittance
by draft rather than cash for items in collection. 80 In addition, because
correspondent banks typically give immediate ledger credit for cash let-
ters received, nonmember banks are often able to meet a substantial pro-
portion of state reserve requirements with uncollected funds and with
compensating balances maintained with correspondents for other pur-
poses. Even though immediate ledger credit may be given for cash let-
ters, depositing banks are not free to draw on these funds until they are
collected. The most important reason many banks continue to use the
services of correspondents is the availability of immediate credit.
The Federal Reserve check clearing service is so vital to the banking
industry that it has virtually controlled the terms and standards for
check clearing since its inception in 1916.81 This position has been main-
tained because the Fed has been able to offer quick, reliable, nationwide
clearing at rates that were subsidized by taxpayers. The early availability
and at-par 82 clearing service offered to banks clearing through the Fed
77. Id. at 43. The Comptroller General has qualified his assessment of the connection
between float and monetary policy by noting that "the argument here is not that every varia-
tion in float is immediately offset by Federal Reserve Board Open Market transactions, but
that open market policy accommodates the average float prevailing over a period of time." Id.
78. One commentator has noted that in the congressional discussion preceding the adop-
tion of the Federal Reserve Act, "control of clearing by the [Federal Reserve Banks] was seen
as a way to make member bank reserves a useful tool rather than an idle fund . Scott,
supra note 54, at 748.
79. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 109.
80. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924) (holding that it was
negligent for a depositary to accept bank drafts in payment from a collecting bank).
Today the U.C.C. approves payment by a remittance instrument. U.C.C. § 4-104(1)0)
(1978). However, comment 8 to § 4-213 makes it clear that final payment does not take place
when the payor remits. Thus, final payment is postponed until the remittance draft is paid.
This avoids creating accountability of the depositary to its customer before the depositary has
been paid. See B. CLARK, supra note 31, § 4.10, at 4-62 to -63.
81. See W. SPAHR, supra note 36, at 165.
82. In 1916 "par collection" meant that checks could be collected at full face value
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were among the early advantages which established this competitive po-
sition. Today these advantages are dwindling because the Fed has re-
sponded to the mandate of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (MCA),8 3 by pricing its check clearing services
and improving efficiency to reduce the level of float in the Fed.
These recent changes in policy have resulted in the development of
strong competition from private check clearing services.84 In many in-
stances, credit can be obtained for items that are still in the process of
collection, within forty-eight hours after forwarding. In response to the
Fed's decision to retreat from its longstanding policy of providing free
clearing services and tax-subsidized, interest-free loans in the form of
early availability to banks participating in the check clearing system, pri-
vate clearinghouse and correspondent arrangements have become more
attractive because they now provide the early availability formerly avail-
able from the Fed.
85
The Floating Check Game: The Need For Change
Return of Dishonored Checks
The treatment of check returns is dramatically different from that of
check collections. When a check is forwarded for collection, it receives
the benefit of jet couriers and expedited high speed processing. In sharp
through the Federal Reserve Bank with deductions when remitting. Collecting banks were
expected to charge their customers for the expenses attributable to collection. W. SPAHR,
supra note 36, at 193.
83. The Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 91 Stat. 132 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
84. See Frodin, supra note 36, at 5. The author observes that the choices banks make at
each stage of the check collection process depend on the following factors:
Two economic factors loom large-the cost of the service and quality .... The
quality of service depends primarily on availability of funds, that is, how promptly a
bank receives credit on checks it presents for collection. Promptness, in turn, de-
pends on deposit, transportation, and availability schedules offered by various agents
.... Early availability [was] particularly [important] for high dollar value checks.
Id.
Commercial check clearing studies now make shopping for the fastest and most advanta-
geous check clearing arrangements quite feasible. Phoenix Hecht, Inc. of Chicago conducts
one such study semi-annually that is designed to measure check presentation times to and from
more than 150 banks. Letter from Daniel R. Morrisey, National Sales Consultant, Phoenix
Hecht, Inc., to author (June 17, 1983) (copy on file with Hastings Law Journal).
85. Frodin, supra note 36, at 17-18.
The advent of pricing policies will also have a direct impact on delayed availability solu-
tions. If changes in return item processing depend upon the creation of new Federal Reserve
services, such as direct return through the Fed, this new service will also have to be priced to
comply with the Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 91 Stat. 132 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
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contrast, items that have been returned, for whatever reason, are handled
manually. Each returned item is read and sorted separately without the
benefit of the MICR strip, which permits high speed sorting during the
initial trip to the payor. Because this is a labor-intensive process, it is
slower and more prone to human error. Highly skilled clerical staff are
needed to decipher incomplete, missing, and partially obliterated en-
dorsements, adding to the cost of processing.
8 6
Each item is then forwarded to the next prior collecting bank, rather
than directly to the original depositary bank. Because of the relatively
small volume involved,87 most dishonored checks are returned to the
payor bank using the postal service, further increasing the risk of error.
s8
The result is a highly inefficient method for returning items in which the
risk of loss and delay increases exponentially89 with each mailing to the
next prior collecting bank.90
The delays and inaccuracies in processing returned checks have a
direct impact upon the availability of deposited funds. The check collec-
tion system operates on the premise that no news is good news. The
depositary bank has no inexpensive way of knowing precisely when an
item has been paid. As a result, the vast majority of checks, some 99.3%
of all items written, become final and are paid without any communica-
tion to any of the forwarding banks.91 Conversely, a depositary bank will
know that an item has been dishonored only when the check itself is
returned after a lengthy series of transfers which retrace the original
route for collection. The precise moment when a transit or clearinghouse
item has been paid is so ambiguous that the depositary bank has substan-
tial discretion to restrict availability for periods often far in excess of the
customary times for actual payment.
There are currently no real restraints on a bank's decision to with-
86. IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
87. The number of checks returned unpaid after presentment for payment has remained
consistent. Less than one percent (approximately 0.67%) of the volume is subject to return
processing. See id. at 23-29; see also U.C.C. § 4-212 comment 1 (1978).
88. The banking industry recognizes the additional risk created by using the postal ser-
vice for return item processing. One industry report observed that "[a]nother factor com-
pounding the delays caused by circuitous routing is that return items often flow through the
mail system and are subject to the usual delays of the postal service." RETURN ITEM
TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; see also IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS, supra note 3,
at 27 (five percent of the dollar losses incurred by banks participating in the study were due to
returned cash letters and items lost in the mails on the way to the previous endorser).
89. The Bank Administration Institute reports that 39% of the dollar losses on return
items experienced by banks were due to obliterated endorsements resulting from multiple han-
dling and poorly maintained equipment. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 26.
90. Id.
91. U.C.C. § 4-212 comment 1 (1978).
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hold fumds.92 One of the most perplexing omissions from the U.C.C. is
its silence concerning the method for returning items which have been
dishonored. In fact, the U.C.C. section governing the customer's right to
withdraw funds is so poorly drafted that it compounds the ambiguity,
thus strengthening the bank's inclination to restrict availability.93 This
omission, more than anything else, has contributed to the present disar-
ray. The U.C.C. is the only law that governs all check collections. It
applies to collections completed outside the Fed clearing service and,
through Regulation J, with few exceptions to items collected through the
Fed.
The early availability based upon a provisional credit given to the
depositary bank by the first collecting bank is a benefit which might be
passed along to depositors. When, however, a financial institution
chooses to withhold customers' access to uncollected funds while en-
joying the financial benefits of early availability granted by collecting
banks, float has been created.94 Float has become a permanent fixture of
the paper payment system because financial institutions have found it
difficult to resist taking advantage of the inevitable delay involved in
physically transporting checks. Thus, some segment of the financial
services industry always benefits from the early availability provided by
check clearers, without passing the benefit along to the depositors of the
99.3% of checks which are paid when first presented.
95
The Customer's Right to Withdraw Deposits Under the U.C.C.
96
Curiously, the law governing check collection, return item process-
ing, and delayed availability has proven to be irrelevant to abusive re-
strictions on availability. The U.C.C. provides no meaningful comment
on this practice even though many of the problems described in this Arti-
cle emerged before the U.C.C. was drafted. Moreover, the section that
bears most directly on the problem disguises, and thereby distorts, basic
92. A federal joint policy statement calling for voluntary elimination of blanket delayed
availability policies was recently issued. Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve, Policy Statement, Delayed Availability of Funds (Mar. 22, 1984) (copy on file
with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Policy Statement]. Voluntary corrective
action by banks is hardly sufficient given the magnitude of the current problem.
93. See infra note 106 & accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 111-13 & accompanying text.
95. IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS, supra note 3, at 5.
96. When does a customer have a right to withdraw funds subject to a provisional credit?
In most states today, a none-too-cynical answer might be: when the bank says you may
withdraw.
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aspects of the check collection process.97 In fact, section 4-213(4)(a) has
proven to be a formidable shield for banks wishing to justify indefinite
holds.
The U.C.C. does not prohibit a financial institution from giving un-
collected fund withdrawal privileges to a customer. That decision is ex-
clusively a business prerogative based upon assessment of
creditworthiness and other elements of risk. In fact, many banks rou-
tinely grant immediate availability to some customers and refuse to do so
for others. 98
When a check has been processed through the customary route of a
clearinghouse or Federal Reserve Bank, the provisional settlements99 be-
come final when the item has been finally paid by the payor/drawee
bank. Final payment is a magic moment in the law of check collections
and deposits, and the focal point of many disputes. Final payment under
the U.C.C. may occur through inaction, due to the passing of the mid-
night deadline, 1°° or by action, such as payment in cash.101
The moment of final payment is important because it signals the
point at which the payor bank is accountable for the amount of the
item.102 More important, under section 4-213(4)(a) final payment is also
the point at which a customer is entitled to withdraw funds.10 3 The
U.C.C. provides that customers can withdraw funds as a matter of right
only after final settlement has been made and "the bank has had a rea-
sonable time to learn that the settlement is final.' °4 This second qualifi-
cation sets up a zone of ambiguity that can be used to thwart customers'
97. See supra note 11.
98. Commercial customers, for instance, are almost universally exempt from hold poli-
cies applied to personal accounts. See NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 6
("Although banks place holds based upon collectibility this is not always adhered to for com-
mercial customers because of competitive pressures."). Theodore E. Allison, in his statement
to the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, noted that "commercial customers generally have
negotiated availability arrangements with their banks. They may get immediate availability,
but have minimum balance requirements. ... Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra
note 5, at 24.
99. See supra note 31.
100. See supra note 35.
101. Section 4-213 defines the moment of final payment as the time when the payor bank
has either (a) paid in cash; (b) settled for the item without reserving, or having by law or
agreement, a right to revoke; (c) completed the process of posting the item; or (d) made a
provisional settlement and failed to revoke it within the time permitted by statute or agree-
ment. U.C.C. § 4-213 (1978).
102. Id. § 4-302. For a discussion of the question of when an item is finally paid, see
generally Note, Bank Collection Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 IND. L.J. 710
(1963).
103. See Note, supra note 102, at 720-25.
104. U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(a) (1978); see supra note 11.
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efforts to withdraw the deposit. 10 5
The operative maxim of the check collection system is that "no news
is good news." No notice is given when an item is finally paid. There-
fore, the language of section 4-213(4)(a) is at best inartful and at worst
actively deceptive. The depositary bank will never learn directly that an
item has been finally paid.10 6 Thus, it does not need "a reasonable time
to learn" of the fact of final payment. The only reliable confirmation of
the disposition of a check is the returned check itself and any notice
which might accompany it. Section 4-213, however, permits banks abso-
lute discretion to determine when the risk of return is minimal or nonex-
istent. There are no standards for determining whether the depositary
banker's assessment of the risk is reasonable. Under the U.C.C., a bank
may hold a depositor's money for an indefinite period in anticipation of
delays attributable to the financial community's own refusal to use mod-
em methods for returning checks. 107
The Policy Arguments for Delayed Availability Reform
Return item processing, which is slow, unpredictable, and error-rid-
den, is the chief justification for maintaining discretion to delay availabil-
ity. Supporters of aggressive delayed-availability policies argue that
depositary banks must delay access to funds during collection because
the processing of return items is fraught with delay and error.10 8 No one
disputes that description; every knowledgeable observer recognizes that
return item processing is a persistent problem. The advocates of reform,
however, are unwilling to concede the inevitability of these problems. To
the contrary, return item processing is an ideal target for delayed availa-
bility reform.10 9
Two principal arguments support legislative intervention to limit the
authority of financial institutions to hold deposits for indefinite periods of
time. First, holding deposits is unfair to depositors. An examination of
the check clearing system reveals that banks which use the Fed have
105. The right to withdraw funds for which final payment has not been clearly determined
is important only to those customers whose accounts have dropped below the amount of the
recent deposit. Thus, many customers with balances well above the amount of an item depos-
ited may be unaware of the delayed availability.
106. There are, of course, good and defensible reasons why notice of final payment is never
sent. If the 99.3% of all checks which are honored on the first presentation were the subject of
notice of payment, the check collection system would grind to a halt.
107. See infra notes 193-95 & accompanying text for a discussion of recent changes to the
U.C.C. that have been adopted in two states to address the float, or delayed availability,
problem.
108. See Policy Statement, supra note 92, at 2.
109. See RPTuRN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-11.
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enjoyed early availability for items collected through the Fed.' 10
The Fed and other check clearers are willing to grant provisional
credit, available immediately or within a short period of time, because
ninety-nine percent of all checks issued are paid the first time
presented."1 This exceptionally high percentage of confirmed payment
assures that the balance of risk favors the depositary bank. The near
certainty that an item will be honored thus contradicts the argument in
favor of hold policies as defensible protection against significant risks of
loss. If the risk of loss is not significant, depriving depositors of the use
of these funds for unregulated periods of time seems unfair. The typical
bank depositor is entitled to the presumption of creditworthiness which
underlies the decision to permit withdrawal before the payment has been
confirmed or assumed.1 2 Moreover, under the present scheme a percep-
tion of unfairness is buttressed by the obvious economic benefit to finan-
cial institutions who adopt an aggressive policy of holding funds.
113
The second argument in support of reform addresses the efficiency
of the system for processing returned items. Return item processing is the
Achilles' heel of the paper payments system because it is slow, poorly
managed, and fraught with unnecessary risks and delay.
Four problems emerge as persistent sources of frustration in the
processing of return items. First, lack of uniformity in the method of
return is a primary difficulty. The U.C.C. does not specify how return
items should be sent back to the depositary bank; it only requires that
110. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
111. IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS, supra note 3, at 5.
112. If permitting withdrawal before confirmed payment entails risk because it may be-
come a loan when the item is later returned, then perhaps the substantial insufficient funds
check charges imposed on the small number of returning items compensate quite generously
for that risk.
113. The amount of profit that banks derive from float has proven to be quite elusive, as
the following exchange illustrates:
Senator Dodd: "I'm wondering why you didn't have in your testimony some esti-
mate of how much the banks make on the float? While we do have estimates on the
losses from uncollected funds, .. you don't have any estimate on the amount made
on the float; is that correct?"
Mr. Allison: "Well that's really an impossible thing to say ... you would have to
make some assumptions about what would happen to those deposits if it were not for
the hold."
Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 23 (statement of Theodore E. Allison,
Staff Director for Federal Reserve Bank Activities).
Mr. Allison later wrote to Senator Dodd to report that members of the Fed staff had
developed a formula, which he considered to be only "an approach to calculating such reve-
nues, the actual calculation cannot be performed without considerably more information,
much of which would be difficult or impossible to obtain." Id. at 30.
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each bank handling the item comply with its midnight deadline. 114 Sec-
ond, there is no requirement that items be returned from the payor bank
directly to the depositary bank. Although the U.C.C. contains an op-
tional provision 15 permitting direct returns, it is seldom used.1 6 Third,
the payor has no obligation to send the depositary bank immediate notifi-
cation by telephone" 7 of dishonor.1 18 The fourth cluster of problems
concerns the efforts to determine the identity of the endorsers. Errors
introduced during the initial processing of the item cause much of the
delay in its return. It is commonplace for three to four"19 collecting
banks to handle an item before it reaches the payor bank. On the back of
the check, each bank has placed an endorsement that is often impossible
to read.120 This problem is compounded when the later endorsements
obscure those stamped earlier.
121
In sum, the banks, lacking guidance from the U.C.C., have devel-
oped a system for processing return items that entails manipulations by a
series of banks before the depositary bank is informed of the return. The
inefficiencies in these methods are the target of reform efforts.
114. See supra note 35.
115. U.C.C. § 4-212(2) (1978) provides: "Within the time and manner prescribed by this
section and Section 4-301, an intermediary or payor bank, as the case may be, may return an
unpaid item directly to the depository bank and may send for collection a draft on the deposi-
tary bank and obtain reimbursement." Comment 4 accompanying § 4-212(2) indicates that
direct returns are an innovation about which there was controversy. Some felt that direct
returns should not be addressed by the U.C.C., but left to develop by agreement among banks.
116. The California delayed availability reform included a long overdue adoption of the
optional subsection 2 of U.C.C. § 4-212.
117. "Wire notice" of return is the term applied within the banking industry to cable,
telegraph, or other electronic communication. In most cases, however, the notice is sent by
telephone. Mulford, The Federal Reserve's "Wire Advice of Nonpayment" What It Is, What It
Should Be, 100 BANKING L.J. 622, 624 (1983).
118. Various notification proposals permit the payor bank to communicate the fact of dis-
honor without being dependent upon the the belated return of the item itself. The payor,
however, would have to absorb the cost of notice initially. This will be true when, for example,
the payor must assign clerical staff to the task of initiating the telephone call after a careful
examination of the endorsements. Thus, the payor will absorb both the cost of the telephone
call and the administrative and personnel costs. These costs cannot be passed on by imposing
a fee directly based upon the cost of the service because the payor in this circumstance would
be under legal obligation to send the notice.
119. Although the average number of handlings was estimated at 2.6 per check in 1973,
this figure can easily be exceeded when the item has been sent forward for collection through a
circuitous route. See IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS, supra note 3, at 2.
120. Missing or inadequate endorsements account for 6% of the dollar loss on return
items that prove to be uncollectable. NoTIFICATIoN PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 26.
121. Obliterated endorsements created during successive handlings are responsible for a
staggering 39% of the dollar losses for returned items. Id.
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Options for Reform: A Critique
The Problem of Notification
One option for improving the system for processing return items is
to separate the physical return of the check from the process for serving
notice that the check has been dishonored. Although the U.C.C. does
not require wire advice of nonpayment, the Federal Reserve has such a
requirement, 122 and a number of proposals mandating a general "wire
advice" of nonpayment have been discussed.1 23 Essentially the payor
bank or the Federal Reserve would be required to inform the depositary
bank by telephone that an item was being returned.
The simplicity of the idea belies the complications that have devel-
oped in implementation. Regulation J and the Fed's operating circulars
now require a payor bank that decides to dishonor a check for $2500 or
more to provide notification of nonpayment to the presenting institution,
usually the Fed. The Fed then initiates notification to the institution that
sent the check for collection through the Fed. This procedure has given
rise to several major difficulties. Because no sanction was imposed for
failure to comply with this requirement, many institutions simply ig-
nored it. 124 There is no requirement that the payor institution notify the
depositary directly. Further, there is no time limit for providing notifica-
tion. This ambiguity has, in some cases, resulted in the returned check
arriving at the depositary at the same time as, or before, notification.1 25
Despite the Federal Reserve's long experience with a wire advice
requirement, several basic questions about fulfilling the requirement re-
main unresolved: who must give the advice of dishonor; to whom must
the wire advice be given; and what sanctions should be applied for failure
to give the advice in time for the depositary bank to act on the early
notification?
The U.C.C. only requires payor banks to return the item 126 or to
122. See Mulford, supra note 117, at 624.
123. See Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1984); Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Circular 1 (Aug. 1, 1981); Pilot Project of the Joint American Bankers Association/Federal
Reserve System Coordinating Committee in Columbus, Ohio (March 1976) (minutes of con-
ference of first vice presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks (April 29-30, 1975)) [hereinafter
cited as Pilot Project]; see also Mulford, supra note 117. The Fair Deposit Availability Act of
1983, S. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1983), requires the payor to send direct notification to
the depositary within 24 hours after dishonor for checks of $250 or more.
124. Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734, 5735 (1985) (supplementary
information).
125. Id.
126. Mulford, supra note 117, at 624.
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send written notice of dishonor before the midnight deadline.127 If the
payor fails to do one or the other, it will be strictly liable for the face
amount of the item. 128 In contrast, the failure of the collecting banks to
return the item or give notice of its dishonor may create liability for neg-
ligence under section 4-202.129 Collecting banks are held to a standard of
ordinary care in giving notice, which can be either written or oral.
1 30
The Federal Reserve's Regulation J is the exclusive basis for the
argument that a bank has a duty to send telephone notice of return.'
3 '
The courts interpreting this regulation, however, have refrained from
holding banks strictly liable for violations of the standard set by the Fed-
eral Reserve wire advice requirements. Instead, they have held that the
Federal Reserve wire advice rules make no explicit reference to a sanc-
tion for failure to comply.' 32 Unlike the U.C.C. provisions, the wire ad-
vice rules in Regulation J do not distinguish between the obligations of
payor and collecting banks. Thus, interpreting the Regulation to contain
an implied requirement of accountability would expose collecting banks
to a dramatic increase in the standard for liability over the negligence
standard now imposed by the U.C.C. Courts have been reluctant to im-
pose such a harsh result.
133
127. U.C.C. § 4-301(1) (1978) states:
[Tihe payor bank may revoke the settlement and recover any payment if before it has
made final payment... and before its midnight deadline it
(a) returns the item; or
(b) sends written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if the item is held for pro-
test or is otherwise unavailable for return.
128. Id. § 4-302 states that "a payor bank. . . is accountable for the amount of. . . a
demand item. . . if the bank. . . does not pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor
until after its midnight deadline."
129. See, eg., Whalen & Sons Grain Co. v. Missouri Delta Bank, 496 F. Supp. 211, 29
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1574 (E.D. Mo. 1980). The court held that when the item had
been returned, the payor bank was under the same standard with regard to notice as the col-
lecting bank. This standard simply required that the bank exercise due care, unlike the strict
liability standard of § 4-302. The bank could then seek to limit the damages available for
breach to those that could be causally connected to the failure to give notice. The depositary
would be required to show that but for the failure to give notice, the item would have been
collected.
130. U.C.C. § 4-202(1)(b) (1978).
131. Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1984), sets the standard of care for banks which send
items through the Fed. In general, compliance with the terms of Regulation J will be sufficient
to meet the standards for check collection stated in article 4. See supra note 52.
132. See supra note 129.
133. One particularly well reasoned opinion reflects the general view of this issue. See
Colorado Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 459 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (W.D. Mich.
1978); accord Bank of Wyandotte v. Woodrow, 394 F. Supp. 550, 557 (W.D. Mo. 1975). This
view has been wrongly held to extend to checks which were not collected through the Federal
Reserve system. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F. Supp. 817
(D. Conn. 1980).
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In addition to failing to specify the liability for its violations, the
current Fed wire advice requirement does not indicate when the notice
must be sent. Instead, the courts considering the question have simply
assumed that the U.C.C.'s midnight deadline is the relevant time limit.
Nor does the rule state to whom the notice should be sent; here again, the
courts turn to the U.C.C. to fill in the gaps. Under the U.C.C. the payor
may return the item directly to the depositary 34 or to the next prior
endorser, as noted above. Unfortunately most banks have chosen the
latter option. 135 Similarly, the practice for wire advice is to send the ad-
vice to the next prior endorser. This practice poses essentially the same
problems presented by returning the item through the forwarding
institutions.
The problems described above have prompted a number of experi-
ments and studies, all of which have met with little success. 3 6 Today,
the wire advice option is considered to be an unattractive business cost.
The payor bank must absorb the cost of increased telephone bills and
clerical expense without any tangible legal or competitive benefit. In one
Federal Reserve experiment, payor banks gave notice for only fifty per-
cent of the eligible items.'
37
Moreover, banks may encounter substantial peril even when they
give wire notice of return, as illustrated in Lufthansa German Airlines v.
Bank of America.1 38 The depositary bank's right to exercise a valid
chargeback was challenged when it received an inadequate notice from
the Federal Reserve Bank. The payee of a check for $63,081, drawn on
the account of a company about to enter bankruptcy, deposited the check
in its account with Bank of America. The check was subsequently dis-
honored because of insufficient funds. The Federal Reserve notified the
Bank of America of the dishonor by placing a telephone call to the
bank's Centralized Returned Items Section.' 39 The call relayed the
134. U.C.C. § 4-212 (1978).
135. See supra notes 86-90 & accompanying text. There is some indication that direct
returns have increased since 1981 when the Fed began implementation of its pricing policies.
This increase reflects a choice by some institutions to avoid the new Fed pricing structure by
taking advantage of cheaper alternatives, including direct return. See Frodin, supra note 36, at
17.
136. See, e.g., Pilot Project, supra note 123; RETURN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 1-2; see also Mulford, The Federal Reserve's "Wire Advice of Nonpayment": What
It Is, What It Should Be, Apr. 1982, at 15 (unpublished portion of Mulford, supra note 117)
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal ).
137. See Mulford, supra note 117, at 631.
138. 652 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. The court viewed the returned item section as a separate branch because it provided
only the sorting and routing service for the branches. The court thus distinguished Farmers &
Merchants Bank v. Bank of Am., 20 Cal. App. 3d 939, 98 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), in which the
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amount of the dishonored check, the reason for the dishonor, the date of
the Federal Reserve cash letter, the name of the maker, and the routing
number for Bank of America. The notification did not include the rout-
ing symbol for the branch on which the check was drawn. In fact, only
one routing symbol was assigned to the entire Bank of America branch
network. In addition, the relevant Fed operating circular did not require
that the branch or the identity of the customer be included in the notifi-
cation.140 Thus, the bank was unable to identify either the payee or the
branch in which the account was held until the item itself was returned,
well beyond the midnight deadline.
The court refused to penalize Bank of America for the delayed no-
tice and chargeback to its customer, holding that the late chargeback was
not a voidable preference under bankruptcy law. 141 The court applied
section 4-212(1), which grants a depositary bank seeking to exercise its
right to a chargeback a "longer reasonable time" after its midnight dead-
line if it has not received by then facts sufficient to provide a basis for
action, and reasoned that the right to chargeback did not terminate until
enough information had been received to permit the bank to act. 142
Thus, after Lufthansa banks subject to Regulation J not only must
give timely wire notice of return, but also must give enough information
to permit the recipient to act. This requirement presents a problem for
banks using Federal Reserve clearing facilities, because the Fed system
limits banks with branch networks to a single symbol. The Lufthansa
problem, therefore, will be inevitable in many instances. Moreover, the
court refused to impose on the recipient of the notice an affirmative duty
to inquire.
143
The Lufthansa problem will be avoided for items over $2500 by the
new amendments to the Fed wire advice rules requiring that enough in-
formation be given to permit action on the item.144 The 1985 amend-
court held that when the bank processing center performed bookkeeping functions which were
previously performed by a branch, the entities must be treated as one under CAL. COM. CODE
§ 4106 (West 1964). If, however, the branch consisted only of facilities for sorting items for
distribution to branches, the bank and the center were to be viewed as separate entities. Luf-
thansa, 652 F.2d at 836,




144. Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 210).
The information contained in the notice shall include the name of the paying bank,
the name of the payee, the amount of the item, the reason for return, the date of the
indorsement of the depositary bank, the account number of the depositor, the branch
March 1985]
ments require notice of nonpayment directly to the institution of first
deposit. 145 The payor bank will be able to choose whether to provide the
required notice by placing a telephone call or by sending the item itself.
The Fed will enhance its current notification service by providing access
for notice on items collected outside the Federal Reserve. 146
A Question of Business Judgment
Given the amorphous system for return item processing, the deci-
sion to permit a depositor to withdraw funds is largely a business risk
calculation. 147 The discretion inherent in such decisions suggests that
the industry custom or the individual banker's judgment in this matter
should be treated with deference on review. In this section, however, the
Article demonstrates that these business judgments can be reviewed
without undue interference with the banking industry's necessary assess-
ment of risk on the basis of sound and objective banking experience.
One controversial banking industry practice is to authorize blanket
holds for all depositors without taking into account individual risk fac-
tors. 148 Yet, in determining a hold policy, there are two primary areas in
at which the item was first deposited, and the trace number on the item of the deposi-
tary bank, and should otherwise be in accordance with uniform standards and proce-
dures specified by the operating circular of the paying bank's Reserve Bank. A
paying bank is not required to provide any information in the notice that it, after
exercising ordinary care and acting in good faith, is not able to determine with rea-
sonable certainty from the item itself.
Id. at 5740 (emphasis added). These amendments incorporate the Lufthansa result for items
over $2500 which are collected through the Fed.
145. See Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (1985) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 210). This amendment is designed to reduce uncertainty concerning the fate of large
dollar items processed through the Fed by requiring, effective Oct. 1, 1985, that payor banks
give notice of dishonor to the depositary for cash items in the amount of $2500 or more.
Notice is required to be sent by "midnight of the second banking day. . . following the dead-
line for return of the item specified in paragraph a [of Regulation J]." Id. at 5735.
146. The fees for the enhanced notification service range from $2.25 per advice for an on-
line Fed Wire message to $4.25 per advice for telephoned requests to forward notice to the
depositary. Letter from Richard T. Griffith, First Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, to Depository Institutions of the Twelfth Federal Reserve District (Feb. 21, 1985).
147. "Although the risk of loss to depository institutions associated with returned items is
relatively small in the aggregate, many institutions point to the potential losses they could
incur on returned checks as the reason for their delayed availability policies." Amendments to
Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734, 5734-35 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210).
148. See Policy Statement, supra note 92.
Regrettably, the banking industry has tended to design hold policies to enhance the profit-
ability of accounts. One commentator has noted that "retail banking is not highly profitable;
working off the float helps recoup costs. Without profits from the float, the banks might have
to increase charges or eliminate services." Saltzman, The Floating Check Game, FORBES,
Mar. 5, 1979, at 135-36. When banks make hold policies an integral part of pricing, without
letting customers know the cost of such hold practices, the result is in effect a misrepresenta-
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which the actual experience of each financial institution appropriately
can be taken into account: the depositor's creditworthiness and the
probability of criminal check kiting or fraud.
When a financial institution decides to permit its customer to with-
draw against funds that are in the process of collection, the bank may
consider several factors relevant to the debtor's creditworthiness. The
bank may consider the length of time the account has been active, the
number and frequency of insufficient funds returns, the existence of over-
draft protection, and the average daily balance in the account.149 In ad-
dition, the bank is entitled to scrutinize the item itself to determine
whether there are any obvious signs that it may be returned.1 50 For in-
stance, the impending insolvency of the drawer may be public knowledge
or known to the bank through other channels. Thus, an objective basis
for doubting the collectability of the item would be sufficient to justify a
reasonable hold to ensure that the item clears. 151 In addition, new ac-
count holders are a particularly problematic group of depositors.
15 2
Thus, evaluation of the duration of the account relationship would cer-
tainly be one of the factors which may be considered. Finally, large
value checks are likely to receive close scrutiny because while the
tion. Some within the industry have supported blanket holds based upon a pricing strategy
rationale. See Position Paper, supra note 2, at 5, where it was noted that: "[A]vailability
polices [sic] can be implemented as part of the pricing strategy of the bank in order to maintain
investable collected balances, while minimizing direct costs to the consumer for checking ac-
count services. When used in this manner, the length of the availability hold would be based as
much on required balances as on collection time." This explicit and disturbing effort to justify
blanket holds provides clear evidence of the need for objective guidelines.
149. See Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734-35 (1985) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 210).
150. One recent case involving MICR encoding fraud, United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 590 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), has caused consterna-
tion within the financial services community. A depositor defrauded Union Trust Bank by
depositing a check with a MICR number that did not match the routing symbol. The MICR
number is printed in magnetic ink along the bottom of the check and allows a machine at each
bank automatically to route the check to its next destination. This number ordinarily is the
same as the printed number in the upper right hand corner of the check. Id. at 490.
As a result of the depositor's fraud, the check was routed through five banks in approxi-
mately two weeks. Because 10 days had expired without notification that the check would not
be paid, the depositary bank permitted the depositor to draw $755,000 against the check.
Union Bank sued the New York Fed for breach of its U.C.C.-imposed duty to use ordinary
care in sending notice of dishonor or non-payment. Id. at 491. The district court denied the
Fed's motion to dismiss, holding that the Fed may be held liable if a bank exercising ordinary
care in the standard processing of returned checks would have recognized the defect in the
check. Id. at 499, 501.
151. See Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734-35 (1985) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 210).
152. There is commonly accepted anecdotal evidence that new accounts (accounts open
for less than six months) are the highest risk group of depositors.
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probability of loss is low, the extent of the loss, should it occur, would be
substantial. 153
Check kiting and criminal fraud, which pose substantial risks to fi-
nancial institutions and their depositors, raise more serious issues. 154
Check kiting is a crime that occurs when a depositor uses two bank ac-
counts in distant locations to take advantage of the normal period of
delay in processing and returning insufficient fund checks. An uncompli-
cated version of this pattern might involve depositing a worthless check
drawn on a Boston account in a San Francisco bank. The San Francisco
account in turn is used to draw a check that is then deposited in the
Boston bank. The kiter may deposit several items in this way within a
short period of time to give the appearance of substantial balances, when
in fact both accounts may be empty or contain very small amounts.
When one of the banks permits a withdrawal of cash, the kite has
succeeded.155
Although blanket hold policies have most often been justified as nec-
essary to thwart criminal kiters, the argument does not withstand close
scrutiny. Every bank has available basic security measures which enable
it quickly to detect criminal activity within an account. Typically, a pro-
file of variables that are reliable predictors of fraud are applied to screen
suspected accounts. 156 Thus, banks have precision instruments available
to handle the specialized problems of fraud; to resort to the blunt instru-
ment of blanket holds is unnecessary to secure protection from fraud. 157
Moreover, the argument that the blanket hold policy is necessary to
thwart check kiters is overbroad, as illustrated by the banks' practice of
granting ad hoc exemptions from the policy. For example, a bank may
often permit corporate and select individual depositors to negotiate im-
153. This may present problems for depositors who recently have sold a house and seek
immediate access to the proceeds. Testimony from the California Association of Realtors
before the California Senate Banking and Insurance Committee suggests that a substantial
number of depositors fit this description. Bankers would prefer to use alternate means of
confirming the availability of these funds. Wire transfer and telephone confirmation of bal-
ances are among the options discussed below. But see Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed.
Reg. 5734 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210). This recent amendment provides notice
within a specified period when checks over $2500 are being returned. This appears to be an
effective way of reducing the risk of large checks to the institution of first deposit. See supra
notes 144-46 & accompanying text.
154. See RETURN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
155. An extended discussion of check kiting is beyond the scope of this Article. Check
kiting, however, bears on the issue of float because bankers have cited the risk of fraud as one
of the principal justifications for blanket holds. See also W. GIBSON, THE FINE ART OF SWIN-
DLING (1966); M. McGUIRE, THE FORGERS (1969).
156. See B. CLARK, supra note 31, § 4.12, S4-18 to -20 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
157. See generally Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
DELAYED AVAILABILITY REFORM
mediate availability,15 8 while more timid and less influential depositors
languish under blanket holds. It has also become standard operating pro-
cedure to grant liberal'waivers and exemptions from the hold policies to
customers who complain.
1 59
A policy of giving ad hoe waivers has been held, in at least one case,
to have no effect on the bank's right subsequently to refuse withdrawal
before final payment has been confirmed, even if earlier waivers had been
given to the same customer.160 The effect of such arbitrary and often
purely subjective decisionmaking is to raise the level of consumer com-
plaint and to tarnish the banking industry's image of objectivity and fair-
ness. In fact, the growing perception of arbitrariness has provided the
fuel for a consumer-led fight against the banks over float. 1
61
A Matter of Litigation
To date no lawsuit has successfully challenged a blanket hold pol-
158. See supra note 98 & accompanying text. Assuming the good faith of corporate depos-
itors, however, can be perilous, as illustrated by the recent E.F. Hutton indictment on 2000
counts of check kiting fraud involving $10 billion worth of checks. Wall St. J., May 6, 1985, at
3, col. 2.
159. See Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 24.
160. Id.; see also, e.g., Discount Auto Mart, Inc. v. Bank of North Carolina, 45 N.C. App.
543, 263 S.E.2d 41 (1980). In Discount Auto Mart the court held that a bank is entitled to
choose whether to stand on or waive its right each time the depositor attempts to withdraw
against uncollected funds. Id[ at 544, 263 S.E.2d at 42. The bank had permitted the customer
to make withdrawals against uncollected funds over a 15-month period of time. The court
upheld the bank's subsequent refusal to honor items drawn in this manner. Id
161. The hold policies that are the subject of this Article have become increasingly fre-
quent topics in the popular press. See, e.g., Ballen, There Are No Easy Solutions to the
Delayed-Availability Problem, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 13, 1984, at 15-19; Cooper, The Banker's Float
That Sinks Depositors, 43 Bus. & Soc. REv. 42 (1982), reprinted from THE NATION, June 5,
1982, at 682; Ross, supra note 39, at 75; Saltzman, supra note 148, at 135; That #1% Float,
TIME, May 16, 1983, at 59; Kasabian, Much Diluted Check Float Reforms Ready, San Fran-
cisco Examiner, July 1, 1984, at DI, col. 1; Williams, Banks' Slowness in Clearing Checks
Prompts State and Federal Actions, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1984, at 2, col. 4; Fed Wants to Cut
Time Banks Hold Checks, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 16, 1984, at 31, col. 5; Bonner, U.S.
Rule on Bank Fees Draws Fire, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at Dl, col. 3; Mandel, Compromise
Bill to Limit Bank Float Looks Like a Winner, San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 18, 1983, at A3,
col. 1; Schares, Banks Gain as State Eases Check Rules, San Francisco Examiner, June 14,
1983, at 33, col. 1; Cooke, Bankers' Float Gets Deflated by Assembly Panel, San Francisco
Examiner, May 19, 1983, at Bi, col. 1; Schares, Regulators Near a Decision to Cut Back on
"Bank Float," San Francisco Examiner, May 16, 1974, at 25, col. I; Schares, The Dispute Over
Bank "Float," Peninsula Times- Tribune, Apr. 24, 1983, at D1, col. 2; Chira, Albany Agrees on
Bills to Aid Consumers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at B1, col. 6; Mandel, The 1 Percent
Solution, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 20, 1983, at A2, col. 1; Kasabian, Banker's Warning if
Float Bill Passes, San Francisco Examiner, July 24, 1983, at D1, col. 1; Mandel, It's Time to
Stop Bank Float, San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chron., Jan. 30, 1983, at A2, col. 1;
Bettner, Banks Still Placing Lengthy Holds on Checks Despite Quick Clearing, Wall St. J., Jan.
12, 1983, at 31, col. 4.
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icy. 162 The most renowned case in which the issue was squarely raised is
Rapp v. Dime Savings Bank.163 In Rapp, the depositor sought a declara-
tory judgment against the Dime Savings Bank to end the thrift bank's
time restrictions on the availability of deposits. The plaintiff also alleged
that the advertising of "free checking accounts" without also advertising
the hold policy was false advertising and fraudulent concealment. In the
plaintiff's view, the policy of restricting access to local checks for six days
and to nonlocal checks for fifteen days violated U.C.C. section 4-204(1),
which requires that a collecting bank send items by a "reasonably
prompt" method.164 Plaintiff also argued that the time restrictions were
162. There have been at least two settlements and one proposed settlement involving hold
policies. In Chadwick v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 792521 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Dec.
22, 1983), the plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and restitutionary relief. They claimed
that the bank placed unreasonably long holds on checks deposited in checking and savings
accounts, and that this hold policy was not adequately disclosed to depositors.
The settlement provided that the bank would not hold most checks under $1000. The
hold period for out-of-state items was reduced from 15 days to 10-12 days. This period was
still longer than that ultimately required through regulations which became effective less than
a year later. See Table infra text accompanying note 197. The settlement also provided for a
telephone verification procedure by which depositors could have the bank verify the funds
directly with the payor bank. The parties anticipated that telephone verification would permit
funds to be released in as few as three business days.
A settlement also was reached in Ricketts v. Lloyds Bank of California, No. 343769 (L.A.
Super. Ct., May 13, 1983). That settlement provided for a one-day reduction in holds and
disclosure of the hold policy.
In addition to Chadwick and Ricketts, a controversial settlement has been proposed in a
recent case, California Consumers Assoc. v. Independence Bank, CA-000-823 (L.A. Super. Ct.
1985), a class action challenging the hold policies of 421 California banks. The settlement
proposes to impose a "fine" of $7500 for each member of the defendant class who wishes to
obtain the res judicata protection from the settlement. Those banks which refuse to pay the
specified amount would be subject to further litigation and possible antitrust actions.
The proposed settlement has generated substantial controversy. See Luke, California
Banks in Quandary Over Suit on Check-Hold Policy, AM. BANKER, Nov. 26, 1984, at 1; Ques-
tions Raised Over Settlement in Suit Against Banks: Motives Challenged, L.A. Daily J., Dec.
14, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Objections have been filed by the west coast office of Consumers Union,
see Letter from Carl Oshiro to the Honorable Norman Dowds (December 11, 1984) (discuss-
ing, as amicus curiae, the basis for Consumers Union's opposition to the settlement) (copy on
fie with the Hastings Law Journal ), and the California Department of Justice, see Letter from
Ronald Reiter to the Honorable Norman Dowds (November 15, 1984) (discussing the Attor-
ney General's serious concerns about the proposed settlement) (copy on file with the Hastings
Law Journal). The objections are based on concern for the absence of equitable or monetary
relief for members of the class and an alleged conflict of interest for the sole attorney for the
class, who proposed that one-third of the settlement be committed to attorney fees.
163. 408 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1978), aft'd, 48 N.Y.2d 658, 396 N.E.2d 740 (1979).
164. U.C.C. § 4-204(1) (1978) provides: "A collecting bank must send items by reason-
ably prompt method taking into consideration any relevant instructions, the nature of the item,
the number of such items on hand, and the cost of collection involved and the method gener-
ally used by it or others to present such items."
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a violation of section 4-213(4)(a), 165 which gives customers the right to
withdraw funds when the bank has received a provisional settlement for
the item, the settlement has become final, and "the bank has had a rea-
sonable time to learn that the settlement is final." The court rejected the
argument under section 4-204, concluding that the section did not apply
to the question of hold policies because the scope of the section was con-
fined to the "general standards applicable to proper sending or forward-
ing of items." 166 Thus, the court deemed the time restrictions "relevant
only insofar as they require the Dime to promptly forward checks to
clearance." 167
In Rapp, the court apparently concluded that any delay in present-
ment resulted because Dime is a thrift bank,1 68 which is not permitted to
clear checks directly through the Fed. Thrift banks must use the clearing
facilities of commercial banks, which then clear them through the Fed.
1 69
The use of intermediate handling, even for local checks, was acceptable
because it was the custom for "savings banks." Therefore, even if slow
presentment were an issue in Rapp, the slowness could not be considered
to be outside the "general banking usage."'
170
The plaintiff's arguments that the bank's practice violated the
U.C.C. were also defeated by the application of U.C.C. section 4-103(1).
This section allows parties to a transaction to vary the explicit terms of
the U.C.C. by agreement, except that
no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of
good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure
of damages for such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
17 1
The court concluded that this section allowed the parties to define rea-
sonableness by agreement.172 The irony is that the application of section
4-103 is made possible by the operation of section 1-201(3), which per-
mits bank customers to be bound by an industry practice without assent
or bargain. 73 In Rapp, the back of the deposit slip contained a "collec-
165. See supra note 11.
166. Rapp, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (quoting U.C.C. § 4-204 comment 1 (1978)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 543.
169. Id.
170. Id This same rationale seemed to apply to § 4-213(4)(a), although the court avoided
a direct holding on plaintitfs entitlement to go forward under either § 4-204 or § 4-213.
171. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1978) (emphasis added).
172. Rapp, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
173. Section 1-201(3) provides: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
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tion agreement" which stated that the "proceeds of a deposit consisting
of checks is not available until 6 business days clearance time has elapsed
for a local check and/or 15 business days on all other checks." The same
notice was posted in each branch office. 174 The court concluded that
banking usage and the specific "agreement" were sufficient to establish
the reasonableness of the practice of six-day holds for checks drawn on
New York City banks. Moreover, the court concluded that the practices
of thrift banks could not be measured by the standard of the commercial
banks and refused to compare these longer times to the faster clearing
and return times for commercial banks. 175  Instead, the court found that
the evidence that other thrifts had .a similarly aggressive hold policy
"conclusively establishes that the Dime's time restrictions are fully in
accord with general banking usage and therefore comport with the exer-
cise of ordinary care." 176  On that basis, defendant was granted a sum-
mary judgment. Thus, section 4-103(1), which was so controversial at
the time of its adoption, 77 became the vehicle for insuring that hold
or usage of trade or course of performance. ... U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978) (emphasis added).
This definition expands the term "agreement" substantially beyond its common law meaning.
174. Rapp, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
175. The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that commercial banks impose
restrictions on withdrawal for three business days for local checks and five to ten days for
nonlocal checks. Id. at 546.
176. Id.
177. During the debate preceding the adoption of the U.C.C., Professor Fred Beutel, of
the University of Minnesota, objected to the aggressive, bank-oriented risk allocation of the
new code. He noted that article 4 subjected depositors to new risks of collection and that
banks were permitted to contract out of every important risk except their basic duty of care.
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334,
357-63 (1952). He concluded that article 4 "was drafted entirely with the purpose of protect-
ing the banks so that they could carry on their business at the risk of the customer." Id. at
361. But see Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE
L.J. 364 (1952).
Professor Beutel singled out § 4-103 for especially caustic criticism. As he explained:
The bank may also change by contract any of the rules set out in this act except the
duty of due care. Thus the "Code" appears to completely approve the type of surrep-
titious waivers consistently appearing in fine print on bank forms, in spite of the fact
that many courts have refused-to enforce "contracts" of this kind. Article 4 and the
definitions of contracts found in the "Code" give them blanket approval.
Beutel, supra, at 361.
Even Professor Grant Gilmore had strong objections to the adoption of § 4-103:
The feature of Article 4 as it appears in the final version of the Code which is
enough to make the entire Article objectionable is the freedom of contract section,
§ 4-103. This Section as drafted provides that banks may by general or special agree-
ment contract out of any of the rules laid down in the balance of the Article, pro-
vided only that a bank may not disclaim responsibility for the exercise of good faith
and ordinary care. The proviso is, however, subject to a double-barrelled exception:
1) banks may agree on what constitutes ordinary care; 2) even in the absence of
agreement, any action taken by a bank which is consistent with "a banking usage" is
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practices would become immune from judicial review.
178
The outcome in Rapp is not suprising. In effect, once section 4-103
(1) is applied, any industry practice which is not manifestly unreasonable
not only will survive challenge, but also may support a summary judg-
ment as in Rapp. In general, litigation is an ineffective approach to the
delayed availability problem. The problem is a national one involving
the entire check collection system. At best, litigation is an expensive way
to correct a symptom of the problem-a bank's hold policy. No lawsuit
can cure the disease of slow return item processing. The result in Rapp
illustrates the need for legislation that overrides section 4-103(1) by set-
ting a standard of reasonableness which cannot be varied by agreement.
Legislative Solutions
Reforming the law regarding return item processing and delayed
availability is a formidable challenge. Any sound legislative solution
must address the following problem areas: First, the customer's need to
know, before an account is opened and periodically after it is opened, the
general hold policy of the institution;179 second, the customer's need to
be informed of the bank's decision to place a hold on any specific item;
third, the need to set maximum hold periods to draw a bright line for
those institutions seeking to stretch the hold beyond what is reasonably
ordinary care. It should be noted further that the "general agreements" by which
banks may amend the Article as they see fit, or agree on what ordinary care is, are
agreements between banks to which the customer who deposits an item for collection is
,not a party but by which he 'will be bound.
This is carrying a good joke too far. The only bright spots are: ...that Sec-
tion 4-103 contains more than one loophole in the drafting on which a court might well
seize to limit the scope of "variation by agreement" which the Section was designed to
permit.
* . . I have not been convinced that it can ever be sound legislative policy to write
a blank check to the order of any private interest group in the community.
...But there are bad times as well as good times; there may even be bad banks
as well as good banks. Section 4-103 goes far beyond what is wise or permissible in
allowing banks to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough.
Gilmore, supra, at 375-77 (emphasis added).
178. While the analysis in Rapp is largely unsatisfying, the most obvious flaw is the court's
readiness to concede the enforceability in contract law of the preprinted statement of hold
policy. Even if one accepts the conclusion that Dime's hold policy is a term of a bargain
transaction that was "ratified each time the plaintiffs voluntarily deposited checks into their
account," 408 N.Y.S.2d at 545, it: does not follow that it was an equal bargain. This case
seemed appropriate for an adhesion contract analysis. Cf Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28
Cal.3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 132
Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d
690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961).
179. See Policy Statement, supra note 92, at 5.
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necessary; fourth, the need to restrict the opportunity, under section 4-
103,180 to vary the new law by agreement; fifth, the central problem of
the methods and routes chosen for handling return items; sixth, owner-
ship of the interest that accrues even during legitimate hold periods; and
seventh, an appropriate penalty for willful violators.
181
Disclosure and Notification
Disclosure and notification are the least controversial proposals for
reform. 182 Although closely related, the ideas of disclosure and notifica-
tion serve different functions. Disclosure is intended to permit bank cus-
tomers to know what the hold policy is before an account relationship is
formed. To avoid the surprise that occurs when hold policies have not
been clearly disclosed, an accurate description of the policy is essential.
A disclosure requirement would permit the competitive forces in the fi-
nancial services industry to work to the depositor's advantage. Deposi-
tors would have an opportunity to examine this policy, along with the
full range of banking services, when electing the banks with which they
do business.1
83
As uncontroversial as disclosure might be, however, the question
remains what should be disclosed and when. 184 A basic objective of this
kind of legislation is to eliminate the element of surprise awaiting deposi-
tors who are unaware of the hold policy in general and of the application
of that policy to a specific transaction. Thus, a model disclosure should
include a general description of the typical hold periods for out-of-state,
intra-state, and local checks.185 An appropriate notice identifying the
180. See supra notes 171-72, 177 & accompanying text.
181. See infra note 223.
182. Every major discussion of the problem of delayed funds availability has endorsed the
idea of disclosure. See, e.g., Policy Statement, supra note 92; AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIA-
TION, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DELAYED FUNDS AVAILABILITY
TASK FORCE, reprinted in Delayed Funds Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 131; RETURN
ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6; see also S. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
H.R. 5301, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
183. Consumers Union has advised its readers to "shop around for the bank in your area
that has the shortest holding periods. We suggest getting the information in writing. CU
callers have gotten conflicting information on successive calls to the same bank." When Is It
Your Money, 49 CONSUMER REPORTS 648, 649 (Nov. 1984).
184. Disclosure practices vary considerably. Among the smallest community banks (those
with less than $50 million in assets), 80% use teller notice to communicate hold policies, 55%
give notice when the account is opened. Seventy-five percent of institutions with assets over $1
billion give written notice when the account is opened and 47% give teller notice. 1984 DE-
POSIT SERVICES REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, 9, 42.
185. Members of the ABA Delayed Availability Task Force prepared sample forms which
were submitted for the record during the Senate hearings on S. 573. Delayed Funds Availabil-
ity Hearing, supra note 5, at 151-53.
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item that will be subject to the hold and the length of the hold should be
sent to each depositor. 18 6 The recently enacted California Delayed
Availability Law187 provides a good, though not perfect, model for iden-
tifying the strengths and shortcomings of legislative solutions to the hold
policy problem. 188 For example, in California the question arose as to
whether disclosure requirements were applicable to automated teller
transactions. Banks had expressed concern about the space available to
accommodate an individual statement of hold policy. The statute re-
quires that the deposit envelope bear the required disclosure.'8 9 The tim-
186. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 866.2(b) (West Supp. 1985).
187. Act of Sept. 21, 1983, ch. 1011, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5388 (West) (amending CAL.
COM. CODE §§ 4212, 4213 and supplementing CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 866.5, 866.6, 866.7, 866.9).
188. Delayed funds availability reform is a politically volatile matter, as was demonstrated
by both the New York and California experiences. In New York, reforms were adopted after
years of unsuccessful effort. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-d (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
Some legislators suggested that the delayed availability reform was approved in exchange for
passage of a bill that permitted banks to continue to charge 25% interest on consumer loans.
N.Y. Times, March 24, 1983 at 44, col. 1; see also Letter from Bernard Karol, Assistant Coun-
sel, New York Banking Department to author, April 20, 1983 (copy on file with Hastings Law
Journal ).
The California delayed availability law, A.B. 1723, was also enacted in a politically
charged context. The bill was introduced by the Speaker of the California Assembly, Willie L.
Brown, Jr., after a columnist, Bill Mandel of the San Francisco Examiner, invited readers to
write to the Speaker to "vote against float." Readers were asked to send a coupon with the
message:
Mr. Speaker: I think it is wrong of banks doing business in California to keep money
away from its legitimate owners. I support an amendment to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code requiring banks to credit customers' accounts within five business days of
deposit, unless the funds have not actually been collected.
Mandel, It's Time to Stop Bank Float, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron., Jan. 30,
1983, at A2, col. 1. More than 8000 readers responded, some adding individual stories of
unnecessarily long holds by banks in the state. See Final Statement of Reasons, supra note 7,
at 38.
There are similar delayed availability laws, either already enacted or pending, in several
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167d, § 34 (West 1984); S. 2851,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5301, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984); H.R. 4187, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5360, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Measures have also been introduced or adopted in Maryland, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, and Ken-
tucky. See Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1984, at 37, col. 1.
189. It was decided that individual notice could be given to customers at automated tell-
ers. Given the increasing reliance on automated deposit takers, this was an important place for
notice to be prominently displayed. CAL. FIN. CODE § 866.2(b) (West Supp. 1985) requires
that the institution "furnish its customers preprinted deposit slips, envelopes for automatic
teller machine deposits or other individual notice bearing a conspicuous summary statement of
its general policy with respect to when a customer may withdraw funds deposited by check or
similar instrument into the customer's deposit account .... "
The major problem of providing a formulaic notice which may never be read may still
exist. Even worse, it may be read but never considered as the basis for decisionmaking. I have
concluded that disclosure is certainly helpful, but that consumer publications which evaluate
the basic information are even more important.
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ing of disclosure is also important; experience with other consumer
disclosure statutes 90 suggests that technical, perfunctory disclosure may
have no meaningful impact on a consumer's level of knowledge about the
transaction. Therefore, periodic, simplified reminders of the hold policy
are in order to remind the customer that the holds are a part of the
bank's basic deposit-taking policy.
Direct notification from the payor to the depositary has intrinsic
appeal. Notwithstanding the problems of telephone, wire, and cable
communication media, recent developments in computer-linked commu-
nications hold great promise for the development of electronic bulletin
boards dedicated to posting return item notices to each bank in the
United States. The approach proposed here would permit the posting of
coded and abbreviated messages, which could then be captured from the
computer bulletin board by the depositary bank in which the item
originated. A bulletin board system of communication would have the
advantage of permitting banks wishing to obtain this information to do
so without the delay and personnel costs of telephone calls from one
bank officer to another. If the bulletin board system were provided by
the Fed, some further reduction in expense could be obtained by making
use of the reduced rates available to users of a national wide area tele-
phone service (WATS) line.
Mandatory Availability
Mandatory availability has been the most controversial feature of
the proposed reforms. It has been suggested that published schedules for
maximum hold times will simply aid criminal check kiters,1 91 who will
manipulate deposits to take advantage of the law. Check kiting is a sig-
nificant problem, but nonavailability of funds is not an appropriate
means of preventing it.192 Undisclosed hold schedules have not stopped
190. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982) (disclosure of consumer product warranty terms and conditions);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982) (disclosure of loan rate and terms); see
also Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Whitford,
Comment on a Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1371 (1982).
191. See supra notes 154-57 & accompanying text.
192. See Pratt, Bank Frauds: Their Detection and Prevention, reprinted in Delayed Funds
Availability Hearing, supra note 5, at 146. Kites have caused losses large enough to eliminate
the capital structure of a bank. Some banks would have closed as a result of such losses but for
the recovery permitted under bankers' blanket bonds.
Losses from fraud are covered by insurance. Therefore, the effect of more fraud, should it
occur, would be to increase the cost of doing business by the amount of the additional insur-
ance premium. This additional cost would necessarily be passed on to depositors. Thus, banks
and their depositors have a common interest in minimizing losses from fraud.
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kiters. Although kiting may become somewhat easier if availability is
determined by law, the banks' unlimited discretion to hold funds places
the burden on those least able to bear it, the vast number of consumers
who write good checks. Ultimately, the detection and prevention of
crime should be left to techniques that are specifically tailored to address
that problem.
The advantage of definite hold periods is that depositors will know
what to expect. Further, if maximum hold times are set based upon the
actual experience for collection and return, the industry custom will be
taken into account, with the result that hold periods will be realistic and
efficient. Finally, definite hold times can be used to provide an important
incentive for securing technological improvements in return item
processing.
The California statute amends U.C.C. section 4-213(4)(a) to dele-
gate to the appropriate state agency the power to establish a schedule of
definite times that are determined to be reasonable. In determining what
constitutes a reasonable period of time the following factors are required
to be taken into account: "(a) the actual time for processing and trans-
port between the depositary and payor institutions, (b) the fastest air
transport time between depositary and payor. . .[and] (c) the most ex-
peditious route and means for processing of returned items."1 93 The ef-
fect of this approach is to convert the expectation that the industry will
improve the design and technology applied to the system for return item
processing into a yardstick for measuring current performance. Thus, if
properly applied,1 94 mandatory availability can serve to prod the indus-
try into making necessary improvements in return item processing and
notification.
Another advantage of definite hold periods is that certain kinds of
items, such as government checks, can be treated categorically, providing
193. CAL. FIN. CODE § 866.6(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1985).
194. Delegating the authority to set a mandatory availability schedule to an administrative
agency has the attraction of permitting more flexibility. For example, if there were a sudden
technological breakthrough that dramatically improved collection and return times, regula-
tions could be changed more quickly than a statute to take this into account. This assumes, of
course, that the administrative process is faster and more flexible than the legislative process,
which is not always true. Professor Fairfax Leary expressed concern that delegation might
prove troublesome, depending on the "composition of the Board and of the political atmos-
phere." Letter from Fairfax Leary to author (Aug. 10, 1983) (copy on file with author); see
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 10.190400. These regulations were the subject of substantial
controversy and as a result were delayed in implementation. See Final Statement of Reasons,
supra note 7.
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for one-or two-day availability. 195 For these items, the reliability of the
drawer or acceptor should override any concerns about the ultimate col-
lectability of the item.
196
The following table summarizes the reasonable hold periods estab-
lished by regulation in New York and California as well as the wide
range of hold periods established in practice by California depository
institutions. 1
97
Table: Summary and Comparison of Check Hold Regulations and Practices
I. State Regulations
If drawn on any If drawn on an
If drawn on a other out-of-state
local institution state institution office
New York State Banking
Regulations; Deposits in -
* New York banks 2 days 3 days 6 days




* Drawn onabank 2days 3- 4days 8- 9days
* Drawn on a savings
institution 4 - 5 days 4 - 5 days 9 - 10 days
California Savings & Loan
Department Regulations
(Deposits in S & L's)
* Drawn on any
institution 4 days 4 days 10 days
California Department of
Corporations Regs.
(Deposits in Credit Unions)
* Drawn on any
institution 5 days 5 days 9 days
195. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 10.190406(a)(1),(2) (West Supp. 1984); see also NEW
YORK, GENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE BANKING BOARD, PART 34 (1983).
196. See Policy Statement, supra note 92, at 3.
197. The table is taken from CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT ON
THE NEW FUNDS AVAILABILITY RULES FOR THE DEPOSIT OF CHECKS IN CALIFORNIA 66
(1985).
"Days" refers to business days. Both the New York and California regulations prescribe
a ceiling of one day on holds placed on checks drawn on the same institution. The table does






* California banks 2 - 7 days 2 - 14 days 4 - 15 days
" Savings institutions 3 - 12 days 5 - 20 days 10 - 30 days
California Public Interest
Research Group Survey
Data; Deposits in -
" California banks 1 - 7 days I - 10 days 5 - 15 days
" Savings institutions 2 - 10 days 4 - 14 days 5 - 20 days
" Credit Unions 5 - 10 days 5 - 11 days 5 - 14 days
Finally, there is at least one important proposal which adopts a dra-
matically different approach to the question of availability than has been
discussed up to now. The Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.) 198
was developed to replace article 4 and part of article 3 of the U.C.C. The
U.N.P.C. was designed to modernize the U.C.C. by providing a compre-
hensive set of rules to govern paper and electronic payments. The ap-
proach taken to the question of availability is of special interest because
the delay in return item processing, which is an unavoidable feature of
the paper payment system, can be avoided at least with regard to elec-
tronic payments. 199 Curiously, the U.N.P.C. provides that customers
have no right to withdraw for three days2c° after final payment for con-
sumer "draw orders." This is the practical equivalent of a mandatory
three-day hold, although it is intended to give consumers the right to
reverse payment orders for three days after final payment. 201 This "cool-
ing off period" is not currently available after final payment for checks
under the U.C.C. 20 2 In its present version, however, the U.N.P.C. has
198. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE (Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.].
199. The U.N.P.C. applies to a full spectrum of payment media: checks, cashier's checks,
wire and telephone transfers, point of sale transfers, automated teller transactions, and other
electronic fund transfers covered by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6)
(1982). U.N.P.C. § 10 order, purpose and existing law.
200. U.N.P.C. § 421(1) establishes that when payment for an order becomes final, the
account institution becomes a debtor to its customers for the amount of the order and follows
U.C.C. § 4-213(3) (1978). U.N.P.C. § 421(2)(a), (b) establishes when a customer is entitled to.
withdraw as of right: "When such payment becomes final and the account institution has had
a reasonable time to learn that payment is final, but in the case of a consumer drawer, in no
event sooner than three business days from the time of final payment as provided by Section
420(1)(c)." U.N.P.C. § 421(2) (emphasis added).
201. U.N.P.C. § 425 (applicable to orders of $50 or more).
202. Under U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (1978), final payment terminates the customer's right to
stop payment.
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exempted "written draw orders" (checks) from this generous three-day
period of reversability. 20 3 The hold of three days after final payment ap-
plies to written and electronic "draw orders." Thus, the U.N.P.C. in its
present version contains the anomaly that consumers who have chosen to
use checks may not take advantage of the three-day cooling off period to
reverse the item, but they are burdened with the disadvantage of what is
sure to become a mandatory hold of three days because under this provi-
sion they have no right to withdraw before that time.
Apparently, this problem is simply a drafting oversight, because the
comments following section 425, on stop payment or reversal of orders,
focus on the need for generous provisions for consumers who wish to
change the balance of power in negotiations with merchants.2°4 Even if
this oversight is corrected in the next draft, it is worth noting that the
present draft would place consumers who choose to use checks in a worse
position than is now the case under the U.C.C. section 4-213(4)(a).
Variation by Agreement
An important objective of any legislation in this field should be to
withdraw the financial service industry's opportunity to use form waivers
and standardized clauses concerning availability. As discussed above,20 5
through the operation of sections 1-201 and 4-103, such clauses are virtu-
ally immune from judicial review. Fortunately, this defect is the easiest
to cure. The legislature can provide that the standards for availability
cannot be varied by agreement.20 6 This straightforward solution ensures
that the statutory or regulatory standards are uniformly available.
There remains, of course, the question of whether the mandated
maximum times can be shortened by agreement. This issue, too, can be
handled easily by a provision that allows the depositary bank to make the
funds available on a shorter schedule if it chooses to do So.
2 0 7
The Method of Return
Every major study of the check collection system has concluded that
banks could be required to use the most expeditious route and means for
203. U.N.P.C. § 425(2)(b) (providing for right to reverse payment order "unless [such or-
der] . . . is a written draw order transmitted for payment to the payor account institution"
(emphasis added)).
204. U.N.P.C. § 425 comment 2.
205. See supra notes 173-78 & accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 4213(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 14-d (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
207. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 10.190404 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 3, § 34 (1984).
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returning items.208 The fleets of jet couriers that are now employed in
collection could be used to return items. Of course, the attractiveness of
this change depends upon consolidation of returned item processing to
enhance the economic benefits of using faster means of transportation.
Several experiments now in progress within the Federal Reserve sys-
tem209 have as a central feature the use of the Fed's check clearing facili-
ties as a regional hub for return items. Under these proposals, the Fed
would accept an item for return processing, even when the item was not
initially processed through the Fed. In addition, after the item was ac-
cepted for return, the Fed would then send the item directly to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank nearest the payor. This approach thus avoids the
problem of having to retrace the initial, often circuitous route taken dur-
ing initial processing.
Given the longstanding unanimity210 within the banking industry
that payor and collecting banks must be charged with a duty to use the
most expeditious route and means for processing returned items, the fol-
lowing amendment to the U.C.C. section 4-202211 should be taken up by
the Permanent Editorial Board:
[1]: A collecting bank must use the most expeditious route and means of
presenting and returning an item.
208. See, eg., NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 10-11; RETURN ITEM
TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2; see also Clarke, Check Out Time for Checks, 22 Bus.
LAW. 931, 932 (1966) (expressing impatience with lengthy check-clearing procedures).
209. The Dallas Federal Reserve Bank began a direct return experiment in 1980. The
program holds great promise, but it has not been fully implemented and is still too new for
critics to determine whether it will serve as a national model. Telephone interview with Mr.
Swett, General Counsel, Dallas Federal Reserve, June 26, 1983.
One legal barrier to the program's success is the U.C.C.'s requirement that items be physi-
cally returned to each prior endorser. To alleviate that problem, Regulation J could be
amended to permit depositary banks to return items through the Fed nearest the depositary,
which would then forward them to the Fed nearest the payor. To date, however, Regulation J
has not been so amended, thus leaving the legal status of items processed under this arrange-
ment somewhat in doubt.
There is, of course, another option. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1978) permits the U.C.C. to be
varied by agreement as long as the agreement does not disclaim responsibility for exercising
good faith or due care. Therefore, a comprehensive participation agreement could be adopted
for such experiments during the interim before Regulation J is amended to permit such ar-
rangements explicitly.
Finally, there is the uncertainty concerning what warranties might arise from the Fed's
handling of return items, especially those that it did not initially handle.
210. See, eg., Position Paper, supra note 2, at 197.
211. U.C.C. § 4-202(1) (1978) currently provides:
(1) A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
(a) presenting an item or sending it for presentment; and
(b) sending notice of dishonor or non-payment or returning an item other than
a documentary draft to the bank's transferor... after learning that the
item has not been paid or accepted, as the case may be; and
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[2]: In addition to the duties stated in [1] of this section, a collecting
bank must use ordinary care in. . . [retain the current language.]
To impose the same duty upon payor banks, the following amendments
should be made to section 4-302:212
[c] items covered by (a) and (b) above if the payor bank fails to use the
most expeditious route and means to return such item.
The proposed amendments place the primary responsibility for se-
lecting the most expeditious route for return upon the payor bank.2 13
This responsibility is entirely appropriate because the payor bank knows
first that an item has been dishonored. If the payor chooses simply to
meet its midnight deadline by dropping the item in the mail, others in the
chain have no incentive to use a more efficient route. In addition, the
payor, as the first point in return, is the optimum place to exert the most
pressure to accomplish the desired objective. Moreover, the sanction
chosen, accountability for an item that has not been sent by the most
expeditious route, is substantial enough that the duty thus created will in
all likelihood be honored.
Direct return can provide an even more important contribution to
the solution of return item problems than expedited methods of return
(c) settling for an item when the bank receives final settlement; and
(d) making or providing for any necessary protest; and
(e) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit within a reasonable
time after discovery thereof.
The proposed amendment would add a new subsection (1) and renumber current subsection
(1) as subsection (2).
212. U.C.C. § 4-302 (1978) currently provides:
In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a presentment warranty.
settlement effected or the like, if an item is presented on and received by a payor bank
the bank is accountable for the amount of
(a) a demand item other than a documentary draft whether properly payable or
not if the bank, in any case where it is not also the depositary bank, retains
the item beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt without settling for
it or, regardless of whether it is also the depositary bank, does not pay or
return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline;
or
(b) any other properly payable item unless within the time allowed for accept-
ance or payment of that item the bank either accepts or pays the item or
returns it and accompanying documents.
213. This would be consistent with those cases interpreting U.C.C. § 4-302 (1978) as im-
posing strict liability upon the payor bank for failing to return or give notice within the mid-
night deadline. See, e.g., Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Prospect Nat'l Bank, 708 F.2d 290
(7th Cir. 1983). The depositary bank's failure to notify its customer in a timely manner of a
dishonored item subjected the bank to liability only for "actual damages." The court reasoned
that despite § 4-302, the depositary/collecting bank was not accountable for late notice or
return. Cf. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Nahat, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 209 (Ariz.
App. 1983); Bank of Commerce v. De Santis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (notice
after midnight deadline permissible due to Christmas holiday).
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because direct return, even when mails are used, avoids the long trail of
prior endorsements created by circuitous routing. Thus, a payor bank
that elects to return items directly to the depositary can cut seven to ten
days off the time for return, even if it decides to mail the item. The
option to return an item directly to the payor bank is now available
under section 4-212.214 Under this section a payor/drawee bank and in-
termediary banks may return an item directly to the depositary bank,
thus avoiding the hazards of returning items through the initial chain of
collection. The drawee choosing this option may expedite reimburse-
ment for the provisional credit by sending the item with a draft for col-
lection, drawn on the depositary.
The dramatic increase in the number of large value checks that have
been processed initially through an intentionally indirect, circuitous
route underscores the importance of direct return. These checks are
often sent through an above average number of banks in an effort to ex-
tend the period of time during which the drawer can make other use of
the funds in the account.215 The remote disbursement practice has pro-
214. This option was not adopted in several states. For example, in California,
nonuniform comments were added which criticized the new section. CAL. COM. CODE § 4212
comment 1 (West 1964). California adopted § 4-212(2) as part of the 1984 Delayed Availabil-
ity Law.
215. Circuitous routing has always been a growth industry in banking. See W. SPAHR,
supra note 36, at 105-07; Turner, supra note 47; Ross, supra note 39, at 75. In recent times
many companies have sought to take advantage of the delay which is inevitable in processing
checks. The practice is variously known as "controlled disbursement" or "remote disburse-
ment." An illegal version of this practice was the source of federal indictments against E.F.
Hutton. See Bleakley, How Hutton Scheme Worked, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1985, at 31, col. 3;
Pasztor & Murray, Hutton Case Said to Involve More Money, Which May Require Larger
Restitution, Wall St. J., May 6, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Pasztor & Ingersoll, E.F Hutton & Co.
Enters Guilty Plea to Charges of Check-Writing Fraud, Wall St. J., May 3, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
What follows is an explanation of how "controlled disbursement" works: A company
seeks to gain extra time for disbursing funds from its checking account. This can be accom-
plished by paying its vendors with checks drawn on a bank selected because it is far away from
the corporate depositor. If a corporate treasurer can find a bank willing to provide the service
of routing its checks through a series of country correspondents in order to delay finality, the
time gained may be financially rewarding. This should not be too difficult because there are
reported to be over 130 banks which offer this service. Ross, supra note 39, at 76. One recent
survey indicates that of 1217 large companies, 59% maintained controlled disbursement ac-
counts in 1982. This was an increase from 49%, two years before. Id One company-Fore-
most-McKesson-by its own calculation earned 5.5 million dollars through use of a
sophisticated remote disbursement accounting practice.
The remote disbursement service typically includes a telephone call to the corporate cus-
tomer each morning stating the amount needed to cover the checks which will be cleared on
that day. Thus, the account balance can be maintained at the lowest level needed to cover
corporate obligations. These accounts are called "zero balance" accounts because they contain
no cash at the end of the day after all checks are paid. This permits the corporation to use the
cash, which would otherwise be idle, for investing in more profitable arrangements. Ia
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voked a strong disapproval from the Federal Reserve. The Fed reasoned
that the practice denied consumers and small businesses "prompt access
to funds" and undermined the Fed's efforts to improve the speed and
efficiency of the check clearing system. Thus, the advent of remote-con-
trolled disbursement provides an additional reason why direct return
should be encouraged. Direct returns would avoid the problem of adding
further to the delay created when an item has been sent forward under an
intentional "race to the slow payer."
Endorsement Standards
Several proposals suggest that changing the technology for handling
checks during the process of return will lead to tangible improvement.216
Each of these suggestions is sensible; this section will only describe the
areas and techniques which are suitable for change rather than criticize
the merits of the suggestions. One obvious opportunity for improvement
is the placement of endorsement. Today, endorsements are placed on the
back of a check in no particular order and often overlap, making it diffi-
cult to read them. Against this background, the attractiveness of the
proposal to assign areas on the reverse of checks for imprinting by the
bank of first deposit becomes apparent. The bank of first deposit is clearly
the most important link in the chain of return because it must bear the
responsibility for notifying its customer that a deposit has been dishon-
ored. Reserved space for the depositary's endorsement will reduce and
perhaps eliminate the problems with obliteration described above.
Carrier Envelopes
Carrier envelopes with preprinted MICR strips bearing the routing
symbols for the depositary could further reduce the level of error in re-
turn item sorting. Canadian banks have already adopted this kind of
system, with some success. 217 MICR encoded carrier envelopes for di-
rect return to the depositary have the advantage of providing a method
for high speed sorting of returned items in bulk. This change would help
to eliminate the errors which now occur because each return item is han-
dled individually.
Ownership of Interest
The delayed availability debate centers on bank customers' right to
use the proceeds of checks that are in the process of collection. When a
216. See, e.g., Position Paper, supra note 2.
217. RETURN ITEM TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
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customer deposits a check that eventually will be honored, the bank may
accrue the immediate benefit of including that sum in its reserves and
drawing interest on it.218 If the customer is not entitled to interest until
the check is considered paid, there may be a substantial period during
which the bank earns interest without paying any interest to the cus-
tomer. In effect, the bank receives an interest-free loan from the cus-
tomer. A successful legislative approach to delayed availability must
determine when a consumer is entitled to interest on his deposit.
There are at least three possible approaches to the problem. First, a
depositor might earn interest from the day of deposit even though the
funds were not available for withdrawal. 219 In the event the check was
returned unpaid, no interest would be credited. 220 Only interest-bearing
accounts would benefit from this approach. A second approach would
permit financial institutions to hold funds without interest payments for
a fixed period, after which the bank would be required to pay a statuto-
rily fixed high interest rate as a penalty. This financial penalty might
diminish the profitability of lengthy blanket holds. Such a proposal,
however, would entail substantial administrative expenses. In addition,
"pricing" float221 in this way would simply treat the symptom without
curing the principal cause of the problem: slow return item processing.
Finally, the period designated as a reasonable time would certainly be-
218. See supra note 65 & accompanying text.
219. The California legislation took this approach:
For the purposes of computing the amount of interest or dividends payable with
respect to an interest-bearing deposit account, a depository institution shall not delay
beginning to compute interest on funds deposited by check... beyond the date on
which that depository institution receives provisional credit for the check or similar
instrument. However, the payment of interest with respect to funds deposited by
check or similar instrument which is returned unpaid shall not be required.
CAL. FIN. CODE § 866.3 (West Supp. 1985).
220. If delayed availability reform is intended to correct the existing imbalance between
consumers and financial institutions, the second option is preferable. Any interest earned by
the customer before the depositary is credited with the item would be a windfall. In the light
of other reform provisions, such a situation would shift the balance of the risk to the financial
institution. It is therefore fair to defer crediting the interest until the institution begins to
receive some financial advantage from the transaction.
Should proceeds subject to legitimate holds earn interest during the period of the hold? If
the account is otherwise entitled to earn interest, interest should be earned during the hold
period. Such interest could be credited either from the date of the deposit or from the date the
depositary is given a provisional credit.
There is another option, which I have omitted, thus revealing my bias. The banks could
refuse to grant interest at all. This option has been wisely rejected in those jurisdictions con-
sidering the question.
221. This approach would be akin to the pricing of federal reserve float. See supra notes
83-84 & accompanying text.
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come the minimum time, even for those items that could be granted early
availability. Thus, many depositors would be worse off than before.
A third approach attacks the problem from the opposite direction.
Legislation could require standard, brief holds-two or three days-for
all items, and financial institutions could charge a low rate of interest to
all depositors to compensate for the risk of returned items.222 This propo-
sal, however, also fails to address directly delays in return item process-
ing. A depositor who might be entitled to immediate availability if
legislative standards were adopted would, under this proposal, be subject
to some delay and the additional burden of interest payments.
In summary, enactment of the legislative solutions discussed above
would certainly improve the present imbalance. 223 In fact, in view of the
long delays in the implementation of voluntary proposals made by the
financial services industry, legislative solutions, properly conceived, have
the greatest potential for true reform.
Conclusion
This Article has demonstrated that while check collection has en-
tered the modern age, return item processing remains in the Stone Age.
The delay in the availability of funds drawn against checks results from
inefficiencies in the method currently used to process return items.
Moreover, the banking industry's policy of placing blanket holds on de-
posited checks is not justified by the banks' risk of loss from dishonored
items.
The Article has sought to chart a path into the modern era by advo-
cating legislative intervention to end the unfairness of delayed availability
of funds and to improve the efficiency of the system for processing return
items. Reform is necessary in several areas: disclosure of the hold policy
to a bank's customers; notification of the hold; direct return to the payor
bank; and increased use of modern technology for rapid communication.
Several proposals are offered to remedy the problem of return item
processing. These proposals will be most effective if they are incorporated
in the U.C.C.
222. This approach would be consistent with Senator Dodd's suggestion: "How about a
system of 3-day credit to the depositor and permit banks to charge interest?" Delayed Funds
Availability Hearings, supra note 5, at 29.
223. All of the legislative proposals and laws to date provide for some civil penalty. See,
e.g., S. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1983) (providing for civil liability of not less than $50
or more than $500 for individual plaintiffs; civil liability up to $500,000 or 1% of the bank's
net worth (whichever is less) in class actions; and costs and attorneys' fees for either kind of
enforcement action).
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